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Abstract
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers.
The agent’s value evolves according to a two-state Markov chain. The designer uses
future allocation decisions to elicit private information. We solve for the optimal al-
location mechanism. Unlike with transfers, efficiency decreases over time. In the long
run, polarization occurs. A simple implementation is provided. The agent is endowed
with a “quantified entitlement,” corresponding to the number of units he is entitled to
claim in a row.
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JEL numbers: C73, D82.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the dynamic allocation of resources when monetary transfers are not
allowed, and the optimal use of the resources is the private information of a strategic agent.
We seek the social choice mechanism that maximizes efficiency. The societal decision not
to allow monetary transfers in certain contexts – whether for economic, physical, legal, or
ethical reasons – is taken as given. The good to be allocated is perishable.1 Absent private
∗Financial support from NSF Grant SES-1530608 is gratefully acknowledged. Johannes Hörner acknowl-
edges funding from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d’Avenir program). This paper
was previously circulated under the title “Dynamic Mechanisms without Money.”
†Department of Economics, Northwestern University, yingni.guo@northwestern.edu.
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1Many allocation decisions involve goods or services that are perishable, such as how a nurse or a worker
should divide their time; which patients should receive scarce medical resources (e.g., blood or treatments);
how governments should distribute vouchers (e.g., regarding food, health services, or schooling); or which
investments and activities should be approved by a firm.
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information, the allocation problem is trivial: the good should be provided if and only if its
value exceeds its cost. However, in the presence of private information, and in the absence
of transfers, linking future allocation decisions to current decisions is the only instrument to
elicit truthful information. Our goal is to understand this link and the form of inefficiencies
that will arise.
In each round, the agent privately learns his value for a good, which is either high or low.
The agent always enjoys consumption, and enjoys it more when his value is high. However,
supplying the good entails a fixed cost, so it is efficient only when the value is high. There
is no statistical evidence concerning the agent’s value, even ex post.
The agent’s value evolves over time and exhibits persistence – the higher today’s value
is, the more likely tomorrow’s value will be high. Persistence raises substantial technical
challenges, but it is realistic in most applications, and substantially affects the structure and
the performance of the optimal mechanism.
To characterize the optimal allocation mechanism, we cast this problem as an agency
model. A principal with commitment power chooses when to supply the good, given the
agent’s reports. If transfers were possible, charging the agent the supply cost would induce
him to reveal his value truthfully. Without transfers, inefficiencies are inevitable.
The optimal mechanism can be described as a quantified entitlement, corresponding to
the number of units that the agent can claim consecutively with no questions asked. In every
round, the agent’s entitlement first drops by one unit, and he is given the option to consume
today’s unit. If the agent does so, the game moves on to the next round. If the agent
forgoes today’s unit, his entitlement is augmented by a certain amount. The increment is
chosen such that the low-value agent would be indifferent between consuming today’s unit
and consuming those incremental units, if he were to cash in his entitlement as quickly as
possible, with those incremental units last.
This mechanism results in straightforward dynamics. In the initial phase, the agent
claims the unit if his value is high, and forgoes it if it is low. In the long run, his entitlement
either drops to zero or becomes literally infinite. In the former case, the unit is never supplied
again – in essence, the agent is terminated. In the latter case, the unit is always supplied –
the agent is “tenured.” Hence, an initial phase of efficient allocations leads to one of these two
inefficient outcomes. From the agent’s perspective, polarization arises eventually, since he
receives either his worst or his best outcome forever. After some histories the good is never
provided again. In this sense, the scarcity of good provision is endogenously determined to
elicit information.
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The intuition for this structure is as follows. Whenever the value is high, the interests
of the two parties are most aligned. There is no better time to supply the unit than in such
a round, since the agent’s future expected values cannot be higher than today’s. Whenever
the value is low, the interests of the two parties are the least aligned. Granting entitlement
to future units is a way to deter the low-value agent from claiming to be high and consuming
today. A key feature of the mechanism is that the principal adds these incremental units
at the tail of the agent’s current entitlement. Because the low-value agent anticipates his
future values to go up on average, the later these incremental units accrue, the more aligned
the two parties’ interests become.
As mentioned above, the optimal allocation is implemented by a quantified entitlement.
The updating of the entitlement when the agent forgoes the unit depends on his current
entitlement level. Because the low-value agent expects his future values to go up, each incre-
mental unit (attached to the tail of his entitlement) is especially valuable if his entitlement is
already large, since his value is more likely to be high by the time he claims this incremental
unit. Hence, when we control for impatience, an agent with a small entitlement must be
granted more incremental units than an agent with a large one.
What is the impact of persistence? As values become more persistent, a low value today
has a larger impact on the expected value in future rounds. Hence, the principal has to
promise more in the future for the low-value agent to forgo the current unit. As a result,
the agent’s entitlement is absorbed more quickly into the inefficient outcomes (i.e., zero or
infinity). Hence, persistence jeopardizes the principal’s ability to use future allocations to
induce truth-telling. Efficiency decreases with persistence.
Our findings contrast with those in studies of static design with multiple units (e.g.,
Jackson and Sonnenschein, 2007), since the optimal mechanism is not a (discounted) quota
mechanism as commonly studied in the literature: the sequence of reports matters. The total
(discounted) number of units that the agent receives is not fixed. Depending on the sequence
of reports, the agent might ultimately receive few or many units. By backloading inefficien-
cies, our mechanism exploits the agent’s ignorance regarding his future values. In section
2, we use a simple, two-round example to illustrate that the benefit of using the optimal
mechanism over the quota mechanism could be quite stark when the agent’s value is highly
persistent. Examining the continuous-time limit of our model, we show that our mechanism
results in a higher rate of convergence to efficiency than does the quota mechanism.2
Backloading inefficiency contrasts with the outcome in dynamic mechanisms with trans-
2See Lemma 8 in online appendix E.
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fers (e.g., Battaglini, 2005; Pavan, Segal, and Toikka, 2014). Unlike models with transfers,
here efficiency decreases over time. As explained above, the allocation stops being efficient
from some random time onward. Eventually, the agent is granted the unit either forever or
never again. Hence, polarization is inevitable, but immiseration is not. This long-run polar-
ization differs from the long-run immiseration in principal-agent models with risk aversion
(Thomas and Worrall, 1990).
Our insights extend to settings in which payments are one-sided, from the principal to
the agent. We discuss this extension in section 5.5.
Applications: Allocation problems without transfers are plentiful. Our results inform the
best practices on dynamic resource allocation policies. For instance, consider nurses who
must decide whether to take seriously alerts triggered by patients. The opportunity cost
is significant. Patients appreciate quality time with nurses regardless of how urgent their
need is. This preference misalignment produces a challenge with which every hospital must
contend: ignore alarms and risk that a patient with a serious condition is not attended to,
or heed all alarms and overwhelm the nurses. “Alarm fatigue” is a problem that health
care institutions must confront (e.g., Sendelbach, 2012). We suggest the best approach for
trading off the risks of neglecting a patient in need and responding to one who simply “cries
wolf.”
Our results also shed light on the design of antipoverty programs (e.g., Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2005). The poor have little liquidity left once subsistence requirements are
met. The government can supply a good that the poor might value highly, but it must
rely on information obtained from the poor themselves. If the program were one-shot, the
supply would fail to respond to the local needs. However, if the program is long-lasting,
our results imply that the optimal allocation mechanism is a quantified entitlement. Our
mechanism improves the targeting of service delivery. Similarly, the results apply to other
welfare programs for which the transfers from the citizens to the government are limited
(e.g., Alderman, 2002).
As a third application, consider the problem of dynamic allocation schemes in (cloud)
computing. Due to lack of resources, it is not possible for cloud providers to satisfy all
computing requests. Hence, open-source resource lease managers (OpenNebula, Haizea, etc)
must manage scheduling policies to maximize efficiency (e.g., Saraswathi, Kalaashri and
Padmavathi, 2015). Virtual currencies are routinely use in the design of online mechanisms
for such distributed systems (e.g., Ng, 2011). While our environment is certainly stylized,
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we provide an exactly optimal mechanism, as opposed to the heuristic procedures used in
the literature.
Our results readily extend to the case in which there is moral hazard, in addition to
adverse selection. For instance, the agent is a borrower, who privately observes his credit
needs, and the principal is a lender, who can grant the desired short-term loans. If granted
a loan, the borrower can default or honor it – an observable choice. Such a standard model
of lending (e.g., Bulow and Rogoff, 1989) is readily accommodated. Our results apply when
the main instrument to discipline the borrower is through future lending decisions. The
only adjustment needed is that the principal freezes lending when the agent’s entitlement to
future loans is very small, and lets the agent’s entitlement recharge. Once the entitlement
is large enough, the principal is willing to grant loans again, as she no longer expects the
agent to default. We discuss this extension in section 6.
Related Literature: Our paper is closely related to Li, Matouschek, and Powell (2017)
and Lipnowski and Ramos (2018). Li, Matouschek, and Powell (2017) analyze the power
dynamics within organizations, and have a benchmark model similar to our i.i.d. case. They
show that the prospect of future power motivates the agent to make good use of his power
today, and that the power evolution ends with either restricted or entrenched power. Lip-
nowski and Ramos (2018) analyze a repeated game in which the principal decides whether
to delegate projects to the agent. Their principal cannot commit to future allocations. They
show that the principal gives away projects whenever the agent’s continuation utility is suf-
ficiently high, and that the agent is eventually terminated. We characterize the optimal
mechanism without transfers when the agent’s value is persistent. Persistence implies an
exogenous link between periods. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to fully char-
acterize the optimal mechanism without transfers when the agent has persistent information
and the two parties interact repeatedly.
Our work is closely related to research on dynamic mechanisms with transfers when the
agent has persistent private information (e.g., Battaglini, 2005; Pavan, Segal, and Toikka,
2014; Battaglini and Lamba, 2017). Although dynamic mechanisms without transfers and
those with transfers address different applications, comparing the results delineates both the
role of transfers and the different forces that drive the optimal design. (Section 5.5 discusses
the role of transfers.) The obvious benchmark is Battaglini (2005), who considers the exact
same model as ours but allows for transfers. His results are diametrically opposed to ours.
In Battaglini (2005), efficiency improves over time. In our setting, efficiency decreases over
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time, with an asymptotic outcome that is the outcome of the one-shot game. Krishna,
Lopomo, and Taylor (2013) analyze a dynamic screening problem in which the agent has
independent types and is protected by limited liability (although transfers are allowed).3
They characterize how transfers and limited liability affect the optimal contract and the
dynamics.
Our paper is also related to the literature on linking incentives. This refers to the notion
that as the number of identical decision problems increases, linking them improves on each
isolated problem. Radner (1981) and Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) show that linking incen-
tives in moral hazard settings achieves efficiency asymptotically. Jackson and Sonnenschein
(2007) show that the quota mechanism is asymptotically optimal as the number of linked
problems approaches infinity.4 In contrast to the bulk of this literature, we focus on the ex-
actly optimal mechanism for a fixed discount factor. This allows us to (i) identify the form
of inefficiencies and results (backloading of inefficiency, for instance) that need not hold for
other asymptotically optimal mechanisms, and (ii) clarify the role of the dynamic structure.
Discounting is not the issue; the key is the fact that the agent learns the value of the units
as they arrive.
Frankel (2016) characterizes the optimal mechanism in a related environment. It is
assumed that the agent privately learns his cost of actions before time zero, and that his
type in each round is payoff-relevant only for the principal but not for himself. He shows
that a discounted quota mechanism is optimal and derives the optimal policy in the i.i.d.
case. In our setting, the agent’s type affects the payoffs of both parties. Our mechanism
reflects discounting as well, but the challenge for us is persistence rather than impatience.
Relatedly, the notion that token budgets can be used to incentivize agents with private
information and observable actions has appeared in several papers. Within the context
of games, Möbius (2001) shows that using the difference in the numbers of favors granted
between two agents as a yardstick for granting new favors sustains cooperation in long-run
relationships.5 While his token rule is suboptimal, it has desirable properties: properly
3Note that there is an important exception to the quasilinearity commonly assumed in the dynamic
mechanism design literature, namely, Garrett and Pavan (2015).
4Cohn (2010) links multiple bargaining problems, and constructs a mechanism that converges to efficiency
faster than the simple quota mechanism. Eilat and Pauzner (2010) characterize the second-best mechanism
when linking multiple bargaining problems. Escobar and Toikka (2013) analyze linking mechanisms when
the agents’ types follow a Markovian chain, and show that efficiency can be approximated as discounting
vanishes.
5See also Abdulkadiroğlu and Bagwell (2012). Olszewski and Safronov (2018a, 2018b) show that the
efficient outcome can be approximated by chip-strategy equilibria as discounting vanishes. In contrast, we
characterize the optimal mechanism for a fixed discount factor.
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calibrated, it yields an efficient allocation as discounting vanishes. Hauser and Hopenhayn
(2008) measure the optimality of a simple token rule (according to which each favor is
weighted equally, independent of the history), showing that this rule might be too simple
(the efficiency cost reaching up to 30% of surplus). Our model can be viewed as a game
with one-sided incomplete information in which the production cost is known. There are
several important differences, however. First, our principal has commitment and hence is
not tempted to act opportunistically. Second, our agent’s information is persistent, so he
has private information not only about today’s value but also about future values.6
Some principal-agent models find that simple capital-budgeting rules are exactly optimal
in related models (e.g., Malenko, 2019). Our results suggest how to extend such rules when
values are persistent. Indeed, in the i.i.d. case, our mechanism admits an implementation
in terms of a two-part tariff.7 Only through the general persistent environment do we learn
that it is more natural to interpret the budget as an entitlement for consecutive units that
the agent can claim, rather than a budget with a fixed “currency” value.
More generally, it has long been recognized that allocation rights to other units can be
used as a “currency” to elicit private information. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) explain
how this can be viewed as a pseudo-market. Miralles (2012) solves a two-unit version, with
both values being privately known at the outset.
We formulate the optimal mechanism design in a repeated hidden-information environ-
ment as a dynamic programming problem, following Green (1987), Atkeson and Lucas (1992)
and Thomas and Worrall (1990). Thomas and Worrall (1990) characterize the optimal in-
surance contract, showing that the agent’s future utility becomes arbitrarily negative with
probability one. In our environment, polarization rather than immiseration results in the
long run. The dynamic programming approach is also used to study repeated moral hazard
problems (e.g., Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)). Unlike
the bulk of the literature, we assume that the agent’s values are serially correlated and ex-
plore how persistence affects the performance of the optimal mechanism. Building on the
recursive method by Fernandes and Phelan (2000), we fully characterize the set of interim
utilities and the optimal mechanism, and show that higher persistence hurts the principal.8
6This results in different limiting models in continuous time. Our model corresponds to the Markovian
case in which flow values switch according to a Poisson process. In Hauser and Hopenhayn (2008), the
lump-sum value arrives according to a Poisson process.
7If the agent wants to consume the unit, he pays a fixed utility budget.
8Fu and Krishna (2017) study the optimal financial contract when the agent’s type is persistent. Since
transfers are allowed, they show that all utility vectors above the 45 degree line are feasible interim utilities.
In contrast, our principal can only use future allocations to incentivize truth-telling, leading to a completely
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In section 2, we illustrate the essence of our problem and solution with a two-round
example. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 examines the i.i.d. case, introducing
many of the ideas of the paper, while section 5 examines the general model and develops an
implementation for the optimal mechanism. Section 6 discusses extensions.
2 An Example
A principal (she) and an agent (he) interact for two rounds: today and tomorrow. There
is no discounting, so each party maximizes the sum of today’s and tomorrow’s payoffs. In
each round, the agent privately observes his value for a good, and the principal can supply
the good at a cost c = 9
4
. The agent’s value is either high, h = 3, or low, l = 1, and it
changes over time. Today’s value is equally likely to be high or low. Tomorrow’s value stays






. A higher value of κ corresponds to
stronger persistence.
When the good is supplied, the principal’s payoff is the agent’s value minus the cost.
Hence, the principal wants to supply the good only when the agent has a high value. However,
the principal must rely on the agent’s reports. Given that the agent is strategic, the principal
knows that truthful reporting does not come for free. If the interaction was one-shot, the
principal would not supply the good, as the expected value falls short of the cost. Similarly,
if she knew that today’s value is low, she would prefer not to supply the good tomorrow,
since the current low type’s expected value tomorrow, vl := κl + (1 − κ)h, would be even
lower than the expected value in the first round (and hence vl < c).
Under a quota mechanism, the principal decides on how many units she will supply in
total. The agent allocates these units whenever he likes. In this example, the optimal quota
number will be either one or zero. If the agent has a quota of one unit, a current high type











The expected value vl decreases in κ, because a current low type is unlikely to switch to
high when persistence is strong. The principal’s payoff from offering a quota of one unit is
positive if κ < 3
4
. Otherwise, the principal prefers to never supply the good.
Our mechanism offers a number of units that the agent can claim consecutively. Whenever
the agent forgoes a unit, this number is adjusted so that the current low type is indifferent
different characterization of the set of interim utilities and the optimal mechanism.
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between forgoing the unit and not doing so. In this example, the principal either offers no
unit at all, or offers to supply today’s unit. If the principal offers today’s unit, but the
agent forgoes it, the principal will supply tomorrow’s unit with probability l
vl
. Since the low
type’s expected value tomorrow is exactly vl, he is indifferent between consuming today, and
consuming tomorrow with probability l
vl













This is always higher than the payoff from offering a quota of one unit, due to the multiplier
l
vl
< 1. This payoff is positive if and only if κ < 6
7
.
The quota mechanism manages to align the two parties’ incentives to some extent, but
is much less efficient than the optimal mechanism. The performance difference is quite stark







, both mechanisms give the principal
a positive payoff. However, the principal’s payoff difference across the two mechanisms in-








still gives the principal a positive payoff, while the quota mechanism never supplies the good.
This example shows how the optimal mechanism differs from the quota mechanism, and
how it cranks up the reward for forgoing a unit as persistence increases. However, it fails to
illustrate how this reward is distributed intertemporally – as explained, with persistence, it
is optimal to append the awarded claims at the tail of the agent’s current entitlement. Also,
the example cannot convey what happens in the long run. For these reasons, we now turn
to the infinite-horizon problem.
3 The Model
Time n = 0, 1, . . . , is discrete, and the horizon is infinite. There are two parties, a principal
(she) and an agent (he). In each round, the principal can supply a unit of a good at cost c.
The agent’s value (or type) during round n, vn, is a random variable that takes value l or
h. We assume that 0 < l < c < h: supplying the good is efficient if and only if the value is
high, but the agent always enjoys getting the unit. The value follows a Markov chain. For
all n, the value switches from one round to the next according to the following:
P[vn+1 = h | vn = h] = 1− ρh, P[vn+1 = l | vn = l] = 1− ρl, for some ρh, ρl ∈ [0, 1].
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We assume that the initial value is drawn according to the invariant distribution P[v0 =
h] = q := ρl/(ρh + ρl). The expected value of the good is µ := E[v] = qh+ (1− q)l.
We focus on nonnegative correlation (i.e., 1− ρh > ρl). The value is more likely to be h,
conditional on the previous value being h rather than l.9 Two cases of special interest occur
when 1 − ρh = ρl and ρh = ρl = 0, corresponding to i.i.d. values and perfectly persistent
values.10
At the beginning of each round, only the agent is informed of the value. The two parties
share a common discount factor δ < 1, where δ > l/µ and δ > 1/2.11 The supply decision in
round n is denoted by xn ∈ {0, 1}; xn = 1 means that the good is supplied. The principal
internalizes both the cost of supplying the good and its value to the agent. Thus, given an
infinite history {vn, xn}
∞










Throughout, the terms payoff and utility refer to the expectations of these values.
Given the principal’s commitment, we may focus on mechanisms in which the agent
truthfully reports his type at every round and the principal commits to a possibly random
supply decision as a function of the entire history of reports. This is without loss of generality.
(Because preferences are time-separable, the mechanism may be taken as independent of past
supply decisions.)
Formally, a direct mechanism, or policy, is a collection (xn)
∞
n=0, xn : {l, h}
n+1 → [0, 1],
mapping the agent’s reports up to round n onto a probability of supplying the unit in round
n. A direct mechanism induces a Markov decision problem for the agent. A reporting
strategy is a collection (rn)
∞
n=0, where rn : {l, h}
n×{l, h} → ∆({l, h}) maps previous reports
and the value in round n onto a report for that round.12 The policy is incentive-compatible
9We comment on the case in which values are negatively correlated in footnote 31.
10There are well-known examples in the literature in which persistence changes results more drastically
than it does here; see, for instance, Halac and Yared (2015).
11It is important that the discount factor be common. Here, this is a natural assumption, because we
view our principal as a social planner trading off the agent’s utility with the social cost of providing the
good.
12Given past reports and the current value, the decision problem from round n onward does not depend
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if reporting the current value truthfully is always optimal.
Our first objective is to solve for the optimal policy, which maximizes the principal’s
payoff subject to incentive compatibility. Second, we derive a simple indirect implementation.
Finally, we explore how the agent’s utility evolves under the optimal policy.
We now comment on three assumptions maintained throughout.
– There is no ex post signal regarding the realized value of the agent. In particular,
the principal does not observe the agent’s realized utility. Plainly, this does not fit all
applications. In some cases, a signal about the true value obtains whether the good
is supplied or not. In other cases, a signal occurs only if the good is supplied. It is
also possible that this signal occurs only from not supplying the good, if supplying it
averts a risk. Presumably, the optimal mechanism differs according to the monitoring
structure. Understanding what happens without any signal is a natural first step.
– The principal commits ex ante to a possibly randomized mechanism. This assumption
brings our analysis closer to the literature on dynamic mechanism design and distin-
guishes it from the literature on token budgets, which typically assumes no commitment
on either side and solves for the equilibria of the game. In section 6, we discuss how
renegotiation-proofness affects our results.
– The good is perishable. Hence, previous supply choices affect neither feasible nor desir-
able future opportunities. If the good were durable and only one unit were demanded,
the problem would be a stopping problem, as in Kováč, Krähmer, and Tatur (2014).
4 Independent Types
We begin with the benchmark case in which types are i.i.d. Section 5 is devoted to the
general case.
With independent types, it is well known that attention can be restricted to policies that
are represented by a tuple of functions ph, pl : [0, µ] → [0, 1] and Uh, Ul : [0, µ] → [0, µ],
mapping the agent’s promised utility U onto (i) the probabilities ph(U), pl(U) of supply-
ing the good in the current round given the current report, and (ii) a continuation utility
Uh(U), Ul(U) starting from the next round.
13 These functions must be consistent in the sense
on past values. Hence, without loss of generality, this strategy does not depend on past values.
13See Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990). Not every policy can be summarized
this way, as the principal need not treat two histories leading to the same continuation utility identically.
However, the principal’s payoff must be maximized by some policy that does so.
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that, given U , the probabilities of supplying the good and the continuation utilities yield
U to the agent. This condition is called promise keeping. We stress that U is the ex ante
utility in a given round. It is computed before the agent’s value is realized.
Because such a policy is Markovian with respect to the promised utility U , the principal’s
payoff is also a function of U only. Hence, solving for the optimal policy and the (principal’s)
value function W : [0, µ] → R amounts to a Markov decision problem. Given discounting,
the optimality equation characterizes both the optimal policy and the value function. For
any fixed U ∈ [0, µ], the optimality equation states the following:
W (U) = sup
ph,pl∈[0,1]
Uh,Ul∈[0,µ]
(1− δ) (qph(h− c) + (1− q)pl(l − c)) + δ (qW (Uh) + (1− q)W (Ul)) ,
subject to the incentive constraints for truth-telling, and the promise-keeping constraint:
(1− δ)phh+ δUh > (1− δ)plh+ δUl, (ICh)
(1− δ)pll + δUl > (1− δ)phl + δUh, (ICl)
U = (1− δ) (qphh+ (1− q)pll) + δ (qUh + (1− q)Ul) . (PK)
4.1 Complete Information
We first review the benchmark in which the agent’s value is public; that is, we solve the prin-
cipal’s problem without the incentive constraints but with the promise-keeping constraint.
The principal chooses the supply probability during each round as a function of the history
of past values. The only constraint is that the agent’s expected utility at the start has to
be some fixed U . Since there is no private information, it is without loss to pick ph, pl as
constant over time.
If the principal supplies the good if and only if the value is high, then the agent’s expected
utility is qh. Hence, for any U 6= qh, the optimal policy cannot be efficient. To deliver
U < qh, the principal scales down the probability with which the good is supplied when the
value is high, maintaining pl = 0. For U > qh, the principal must supply the good with
positive probability even when the value is low.14 The lemma below follows readily.
14Given U 6= qh, there are many other nonconstant optimal policies. For instance, if U < qh, then
efficiency requires only that the good not be supplied when the agent’s type is low. The principal may vary
the probability that the high type obtains the good across rounds, which results in a nonconstant optimal
policy.
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, if U ∈ [qh, µ].












(U − qh) if U ∈ [qh, µ].
Hence, the optimal initial promise (which maximizes W ) is qh.
The value function W (U) is piecewise linear, as illustrated by the dashed line in figure
1. It is an upper bound to the value function under incomplete information.
4.2 The Optimal Mechanism
For the optimal policy under incomplete information, we begin with an informal discussion
that follows from two observations. First,
the efficient supply choice (ph, pl) = (1, 0) is made “as long as possible.”
To understand the qualification “as long as possible,” note that if U = 0 (or U = µ),
promise keeping pins down the supply decision. The good cannot (or must) be supplied,
independent of the reports. More generally, if U ∈ [0, (1 − δ)qh), the principal cannot
supply the good for certain if the value is high while still satisfying promise keeping. In
this utility range, the supply choice is as efficient as possible subject to the promise-keeping
constraint. This implies that a high report leads to a continuation utility of zero, with the
probability of the good being supplied adjusted accordingly. A symmetric argument applies
if U ∈ (µ− (1− δ)(1− q)l, µ].
These two peripheral intervals vanish as δ goes to one, and are ignored for the remainder
of this discussion. For every other promised utility, we claim that it is optimal to make the
“static” efficient choice (ph, pl) = (1, 0). Intuitively, there is never a better time to redeem
promised utility than when the value is high. During such rounds, the interests of the two
parties are most aligned. Conversely, when the value is low, repaying the agent his promised
utility is suboptimal, because tomorrow’s value cannot be lower than today’s. As trivial as
this observation may sound, it already implies that the dynamics of the inefficiencies differ
from those in models with transfers. Here, inefficiencies are backloaded.
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Since supply is efficient as long as possible, the low type must have a higher continuation
utility than the high type. The spread Ul−Uh is chosen such that the low type is indifferent
between reporting high and low; in other words,
the low type’s incentive constraint always binds.
This is because the principal’s payoff is concave in U . (If the principal’s payoff failed to be
concave, she could offer the risk-neutral agent a fair lottery that would make her better off.)
Concavity implies that there is no benefit from spreading continuation utilities beyond what
incentive compatibility requires.
Because we are left with two variables (Uh, Ul) and two constraints (PK and the binding
ICl), we immediately obtain the continuation utilities. The agent is always willing to report
that his value is high, meaning that his utility can be computed as if he followed this
reporting strategy, which means that:
U = (1− δ)µ+ δUh, or Uh =
U − (1− δ)µ
δ
.
Because U is a weighted average of Uh and µ > U , it follows that Uh 6 U . Hence, promised
utility always decreases after a high report.
The high type is unwilling to report a low value because he receives an incremental value
(1− δ)(h− l) from obtaining the good, relative to what would make him merely indifferent
between the two reports. Hence, in expectation, the agent receives (1− δ)q(h− l) more than
by claiming to be low. Thus, we let U := q(h− l) and obtain
U = (1− δ)U + δUl, or Ul =
U − (1− δ)U
δ
.
Because U is a weighted average of U and Ul, it follows that Ul 6 U if and only if U 6 U .
In that case, even a low report leads to a drop in the continuation utility, albeit a smaller
one than after a high report. This is because the flow utility delivered by the efficient
policy exceeds the annuity on the promised utility by so much that continuation utility must
decrease, independent of the report. The following theorem (proved in appendix A; see
appendices for all proofs) summarizes this discussion with the necessary adjustments on the
peripheral intervals.


























Figure 1: Value function for (δ, l, h, c, q) = (19/20, 2/5, 3/5, 1/2, 3/5).
Given these values of (ph(U), pl(U)), continuation utilities are
Uh =
U − (1− δ)phµ
δ
, Ul =
U − (1− δ)(phU + pll)
δ
.
This policy is uniquely optimal when U > U .
We now turn to the shape of the value function and the utility dynamics. For any
U 6 U , the continuation utility decreases after both reports and eventually drops to zero.
The principal is able to deliver all the promised utility without ever supplying the unit when
the value is low. Hence, there is no efficiency loss (i.e., W (U) = W (U)). However, for
U ∈ (U, µ), the agent’s utility reaches 0 and µ with positive probability. Both inefficiencies
eventually occur – the good is denied when the value is high and provided when the value is
low. Therefore, the value function W is strictly below W for U ∈ (U, µ). The solid curve in
figure 1 illustrates the function W .
Note that W ′(U) approaches the complete-information derivative W
′
(U) as U approaches
µ. For U close to µ, promise keeping forces the principal to supply the good to the low-value
agent with a high probability. For U arbitrarily close to µ, the high type’s continuation




Lemma 2. The value function W is linear and equal to W on [0, U ] and strictly concave on












Consider the following functional equation for W obtained from Theorem 1 (ignoring
15
again the peripheral intervals for the sake of the discussion):
W (U) = (1− δ)q(h− c) + δqW
(













Since W is differentiable, we have W ′(U) = qW ′(Uh) + (1− q)W
′(Ul), or:
W ′(Un) = E[W
′(Un+1)].
This bounded martingale is first mentioned in Thomas and Worrall (1990), and is useful
for understanding the process of utilities {Un}
∞
n=0, which must converge to 0 or µ.
15 The
optimal initial promise U∗ is characterized by W ′(U∗) = 0. Hence,
0 =W ′(U∗) = P[U∞ = 0 | U0 = U
∗]W ′(0) +P[U∞ = µ | U0 = U
∗]W ′(µ),
where W ′(0) and W ′(µ) are the one-sided derivatives in Lemma 2. Therefore,
P[U∞ = 0 | U0 = U
∗]








Lemma 3. The process {Un}
∞
n=0 (with U0 = U
∗) converges to 0 or µ, a.s., with probabilities
given by (1).
The initial promise is set to yield this ratio of absorption probabilities. Remarkably, this
ratio is independent of both the discount factor and the invariant probability (although the
step size of the random walk {Un}
∞
n=0 depends on δ and q). Depending on the parameters,
U∗ can be above or below qh, the complete-information initial promise, as is easily verified.
In Lemma 5 in appendix A, we show that U∗ decreases in c. Intuitively, this is because the
random walk {Un}
∞
n=0 depends on c only through the choice of U
∗, and it converges to zero
more often as c increases.
15Since W is concave, so W ′(U) is bounded by its value at 0 and µ, given in Lemma 2. Convergence
of W ′(U) implies convergence of the utility. Because W is strictly concave on (U, µ), but Uh 6= Ul in this
range, the convergence of W ′(U) implies that the process {Un}∞n=0 must eventually exit this interval. Since
Uh < U and Ul 6 U on the interval (0, U ], if we begin the process {Un}∞n=0 in [0, U ], then the limit U∞ must
be 0. Therefore, Un converges to either 0 or µ.
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5 Persistent Types
As a preliminary, consider the case of perfect persistence. The problem is equivalent to a
static one for which the principal either always provides the good (if µ > c) or never does
so. In this case, future allocations cannot be used as instruments to elicit truth-telling.
This makes the role of persistence not entirely clear. Because current types assign different
probabilities of being a high type tomorrow, one might hope that tying promised future utility
to current reports would facilitate truth-telling. However, the case of perfect persistence
shows that correlation diminishes the scope for using future allocations as “transfers.”
With persistent types, ex ante utility is no longer a sufficient state variable. To un-
derstand why, note that with independent types, the agent of a given type can evaluate his
utility based on his current type, the probability of getting the current unit, and the promised
continuation utility. However, if the agent has private information about his future types,
he cannot evaluate his continuation utility without knowing how it is implemented.
However, conditional on the agent’s type tomorrow, his type today carries no information
on future types, by the Markovian assumption. Hence, tomorrow’s promised interim utilities
suffice for the agent to compute his utility today regardless of whether he deviates. Of course,
his type tomorrow is not directly observable. Therefore, we must use the utility he receives
from tomorrow’s report (assuming he tells the truth). That is, we must specify his promised
utility tomorrow conditional on each possible report at that time.
This creates no difficulty in terms of his truth-telling incentives tomorrow: because the
agent truthfully reports his type on path, he also does so after having lied in the previous
round. (Conditional on his current type and his previous report, his previous type is ir-
relevant for his decision problem.) The one-shot deviation principle holds: when the agent
considers lying now, there is no loss of generality in assuming that he will report truthfully
tomorrow.
We are not the first to note that, with persistence, interim utilities must be included as
state variables.16 Yet, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to fully characterize
the set of interim utilities for a dynamic allocation problem with persistent types. The
characterization in section 5.2 is quite intuitive and potentially useful for other dynamic
allocation problems with persistent types. Zhang (2012a,b) develops and applies numerical
techniques, based on Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990), as well as finite policy graphs,
that could fruitfully be applied to extensions of our model (more types, in particular) for
16See Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Doepke and Townsend (2006), and Zhang and Zenios (2008).
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which analytical results appear inaccessible. Not surprisingly, his numerical results echo our
characterizations both of the incentive-feasible payoff set and optimal policy.
For the principal’s problem, we must also specify her belief that the agent’s type is high.
This belief takes only three values: the invariant probability q for the initial round, 1− ρh if
the previous report is high, and ρl if low. Yet it is just as convenient to treat this belief as
an arbitrary element in the unit interval.
5.1 The Program
As discussed above, the principal’s program requires three state variables: the belief of the
principal φ := P[v = h] ∈ [0, 1], and the pair of interim utilities U = (U(h), U(l)) that the
principal delivers as a function of the current report. Let V denote the set of interim utility
pairs supported by some incentive-compatible policy. (Section 5.2 characterizes V .) Let µh
and µl be the largest utilities that can be promised when the current type is, respectively,
high and low, delivered by always supplying the good.17 Hence, V is a subset of [0, µh]×[0, µl].
A policy is now (i) a pair of functions ph, pl : V → [0, 1], mapping the current utility pair
U onto the supply probability given the report, and (ii) a pair of functions Uh, Ul : V → V ,
mapping U onto the continuation utility pair, which is Uh = (Uh(h), Uh(l)) if the report is h
and Ul = (Ul(h), Ul(l)) if it is l. Here, Uv(v
′) is the continuation utility if the current report
is v and tomorrow’s report is v′. For any U and φ, the optimality equation states that:
W (U, φ) = sup
ph,pl,Uh,Ul
{φ ((1− δ)ph(h− c) + δW (Uh, 1− ρh))
+ (1− φ) ((1− δ)pl(l − c) + δW (Ul, ρl))} ,
subject to the following promise-keeping and incentive constraints:
U(h) = (1− δ)phh+ δ {(1− ρh)Uh(h) + ρhUh(l)} (PKh)
> (1− δ)plh+ δ {(1− ρh)Ul(h) + ρhUl(l)} , (ICh)
17The utility pair (µh, µl) solves
µh = (1− δ)h+ δ(1− ρh)µh + δρhµl, µl = (1− δ)l + δ(1− ρl)µl + δρlµh.
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and
U(l) = (1− δ)pll + δ {(1− ρl)Ul(l) + ρlUl(h)} (PKl)
> (1− δ)phl + δ {(1− ρl)Uh(l) + ρlUh(h)} . (ICl)
Note that W is concave on V .18
5.2 Incentive-Compatible Utility Pairs
When the agent has private information about his future values, it is not obvious which
vectors of interim utilities are generated by incentive-compatible policies. For instance,
promising to supply all future units in the event that the agent’s current report is high while
supplying none if it is low is not incentive-compatible. Our first step is to solve for the
incentive-compatible utility pairs. These are interim utilities supported by some incentive-
compatible policy.19
Definition 1. The incentive-compatible set, V ⊂ R2, is the set of interim utilities in round
0 that are obtained by some incentive-compatible policy.
To get some intuition regarding the structure of V , we enumerate some of its elements.
Clearly, both (0, 0) and (µh, µl) are in V ; they can be generated by either never or always
supplying the good, respectively. More generally, for any integer m > 0, the principal can
supply the good for the first m rounds, independent of the reports, and never supply the
good thereafter. We refer to such policies as pure frontloading policies because they deliver
a given number of units as quickly as possible. Similarly, a pure backloading policy does
not supply the good for the first m rounds but does supply it afterward, independent of the
reports. A (mixed) frontloading policy randomizes over two pure frontloading policies with
consecutive integers. A backloading policy is defined analogously.
The utility pairs corresponding to frontloading and backloading policies can be immedi-
18The optimal policy (ph, pl, Uh, Ul) will be independent of φ, because we can decompose the optimization
problem into two subproblems: (i) choose ph, Uh to maximize (1 − δ)ph(h− c) + δW (Uh, 1− ρh) subject to
PKh and ICl; and (ii) choose pl, Ul to maximize (1− δ)pl(l − c) + δW (Ul, ρl) subject to PKl and ICh.
19The incentive-compatible set differs from the feasible set in Guo (2016). Here, the agent has private
information in every round, so an incentive-compatible policy may respond to the agent’s report in every
round. In Guo (2016), the agent has private information only before round zero and a policy’s resource pair
is independent of the agent’s information. This conceptual difference leads to different characterizations and
proof methods.
19
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and set fm := (fmh , f
m
l ). This is the utility pair when the principal supplies the unit for the
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and set bm := (bmh , b
m
l ).
20 This is the pair when the principal supplies the unit only from
round m onward. The sequence {fm}m>0 is increasing as m increases, with f
0 = (0, 0)
and limm→∞ f
m = (µh, µl). In contrast, {b
m}m>0 is decreasing, with b
0 = (µh, µl) and
limm→∞ b
m = (0, 0).
Now consider a frontloading policy and a backloading one such that the high type is
indifferent between the two; the low type must then prefer the backloading one. The low
type’s expected value in a given round m increases with m, and backloading allows him to
consume later rather than earlier. For a fixed high type’s utility, not only does the low type
prefer backloading to frontloading, but these policies also give the low type the highest and
lowest utilities. In other words, these policies span the incentive-compatible set.
Lemma 4. It holds that
V = co{bm, fm : m ∈ N}.
As shown in figure 2, V is a polygon with countably infinite vertices. Importantly, front-
and backloading policies are not the only policies that achieve boundary utilities of V . The
frontloading boundary includes policies that assign the maximum probability of supplying
the good for high reports, while promising continuation utilities lying on the frontloading
boundary for which ICl binds.
21 Among the policies of this group are frontloading policies.
The backloading boundary includes policies assigning the minimum probability of supplying
the good for low reports, while promising continuation utilities on the backloading boundary
for which ICh binds. Among the policies of this group are backloading policies.
20Here and in section B.1, we omit the corresponding analytic expressions.
21Under such policies, a low type is always willing to report high, and the good is supplied after high



















































































Figure 2: Incentive-compatible set V for (δ, ρh, ρl, l, h) = (9/10, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1).
We now discuss several properties of V . Readers who are more interested in the optimal



















When the switching time m is large, the change in the agent’s utility from increasing this
time is largely unaffected by his initial type. Hence, the slopes of the boundaries are less
than one, and approach one as m goes to infinity.
If the principal could see the agent’s value, then she would supply the good if and only
if that value is high. The agent’s interim utility pair is then denoted by v∗ = (v∗h, v
∗
l ), called
the first-best utility.22 We can easily verify that (µl − v
∗
l )/(µh − v
∗
h) > 1, so the first-best
utility v∗ is outside V . Due to private information, the low type derives information rents:
if the high type’s utility is the first-best level, v∗h, then any incentive-compatible policy has
to grant the low type strictly more than v∗l . Figure 3 illustrates how persistence affects the
set V . When values are i.i.d., the low type values the unit in round m > 1 the same as
the high type does. Round 0 is the only exception. As a result, the vertices {fm}∞m=1 (or
{bm}∞m=1) are aligned and V is a parallelogram with vertices (0, 0), (µh, µl), f
1 and b1. As
22The utility pair (v∗h, v
∗
l ) solves










































































































































Figure 3: Impact of persistence on V .
persistence increases, the imbalance between different types’ utilities increases, and the set
V flattens. With perfect persistence, V becomes a straight line: the low type no longer cares
about frontloading versus backloading, since no amount of time allows his type to change.
5.3 The Optimal Mechanism and Implementation
Not every incentive-compatible utility vector arises under the optimal policy. Irrespective
of the sequence of reports, some vectors are never visited. While dynamic programming
requires solving for the value function and the optimal policy on the entire domain V , we
focus on the subset of V that is relevant given the optimal initial promise and the resulting
dynamics. We relegate the discussion of the entire set V to appendix B.1.
This relevant subset is the frontloading boundary. Two observations from the i.i.d. case
remain valid. First, the efficient choice (ph, pl) = (1, 0) is made as long as possible; second,
promised continuation utilities are chosen such that the low type is indifferent between
reporting high and low. To understand why such a policy yields utilities on the frontloading
boundary (as mentioned in the paragraph after Lemma 4), note that because the low type
is indifferent between the two reports, the agent is willing to report a high value irrespective
of his type. Because the good is then supplied, the agent’s utilities can be computed as if
frontloading had prevailed.
From the principal’s perspective, however, it matters that frontloading does not actu-











































Figure 4: Dynamics of utility on the frontloading boundary.
frontloading policy, which simply supplies the good for some rounds without eliciting any in-
formation from the agent. In contrast to a frontloading policy which induces no information,
the optimal policy implements efficiency as long as possible.
Figure 4 depicts the utility dynamics. Specifically, Uh is chosen from the frontloading
boundary to deliver the interim utility U(h) to the high type:
U(h) = (1− δ)h+ δE[Uh | h].
Here, E[Uh | v] is the expectation of the utility vector Uh, provided that the current type is
v (e.g., for v = h, E[Uh | v] = ρhUh(l) + (1 − ρh)Uh(h)). Since the low type is indifferent
between reporting high and low, Uh also satisfies the following:
U(l) = (1− δ)l + δE[Uh | l].
The promised Ul is chosen from the frontloading boundary to deliver U(l) to the low type:
U(l) = δE[Ul | l].
After a high report, Uh is lower than U .
23 However, Ul might be lower or higher than U .
If U is high enough, Ul is higher than U ; if U is low enough, Ul is lower than U under a
23Because the frontloading boundary is upward sloping, the interim utilities of both types vary in the same
way. Accordingly, we use terms such as “higher” or “lower” utility and write U < U ′ for the component-wise
order.
23
certain condition. This condition has a simple geometric representation: let U denote the
intersection of the half-open line segment ((0, 0), v∗] with the frontloading boundary.24 Then,
Ul is lower than U if and only if U lies below U .







which is satisfied when ρl is sufficiently high, that is, when the low-type persistence is suf-
ficiently low. In this case, even a previous low type expects to have a high value today
sufficiently often that, if U is low enough, then the continuation utility declines even after a
low report. When the low-type persistence is high, this does not occur.26 As in the i.i.d. case,
the principal achieves the complete-information payoff if and only if U 6 U or U = (µh, µl).
We summarize this discussion in the following theorem with the adjustments for the
peripheral regions where U is close to (0, 0) or (µh, µl).














in addition to (i) continuation utility pairs Uh and Ul on the frontloading boundary of V
such that ICl always binds, and (ii) a (specific) initial promise U
∗ > U on this frontloading
boundary.
While the implementation in the i.i.d. case can be described in terms of a “utility budget,”
inspired by the use of ex ante utility as a state variable, the analysis of the persistent case
suggests the use of a more concrete metric – the number of units that the agent is entitled
to claim in a row with “no questions asked.” The utility pairs on the frontloading boundary
are indexed by the number of units that the agent can claim in a row. We represent each
pair by a number, z > 0, with the interpretation that the agent can claim the good for the
first ⌊z⌋ rounds and can claim it with probability z − ⌊z⌋ also during round ⌊z⌋. (Here, ⌊z⌋
denotes the integer part of z.) The interim utilities for the high and low types, given the
24This line has the equation U(l) = δρl1−δ(1−ρl)U(h).
25With some abuse, we write U ∈ R2 because it is the natural extension of the variable U ∈ R introduced
in section 4. We set U = 0 if the intersection does not exist.
26Condition (4) is satisfied in the i.i.d. case due to our assumption that δ > l/µ.
24
entitlement z, are written as (U(h, z), U(l, z)):






δnvn | v0 = h

+ (z − ⌊z⌋)E
[
(1− δ)δ⌊z⌋v⌊z⌋ | v0 = h
]
,






δnvn | v0 = l

+ (z − ⌊z⌋)E
[
(1− δ)δ⌊z⌋v⌊z⌋ | v0 = l
]
.
We can implement the optimal policy as follows. Suppose that, at the beginning of round
n, the agent is entitled to zn units in a row. If the agent asks for the unit and zn > 1, he
gets today’s unit and his entitlement tomorrow drops to (zn − 1). It is easy to verify that
the following holds both when v equals h and when it equals l:
U(v, zn) = (1− δ)v + δE [U(vn+1, zn − 1) | vn = v] . (5)
If the agent asks for the unit and zn < 1, he receives the unit with probability zn and his
entitlement tomorrow drops to zero.
If the agent claims to be low and thus forgoes today’s unit, his entitlement tomorrow is
revised to zn+1,l such that
U(l, zn) = δE [U(vn+1, zn+1,l) | vn = l] , (6)
provided that there exists a finite zn+1,l that solves this equation.
27 Combining (5) and (6),
we obtain the following:
(1− δ)l = δE [U(vn+1, zn+1,l)− U(vn+1, zn − 1) | vn = l] .
Thus, this zn+1,l is chosen such that the low type is indifferent between consuming today’s
unit and consuming the additional entitlement between zn+1,l and (zn − 1) from tomorrow’s
perspective.28
Whenever the agent forgoes today’s unit when his entitlement is zn, the principal com-
27This is impossible if the promised zn is too large. In that case, today’s unit is provided with the
probability q̃ that solves U(l, zn) = q̃(1−δ)l+δE [U(vn+1,∞) | vn = l]. The implementation can be extended
to this case. We omit the details.
28Note that zn+1,l is higher than zn − 1, but might be lower than zn. Also, if zn < 1, the number
zn+1,l is chosen such that the low type is indifferent between consuming today’s unit with probability zn and
consuming the entitlement zn+1,l from tomorrow on.
25
pensates him by adding units, zn+1,l − (zn − 1), at the tail of his entitlement tomorrow.
Adding these units at the very tail saves on the units needed for deterring the low type
from consuming today, because the current low value becomes increasingly irrelevant for the
expected value toward the tail. Therefore, when we control for impatience, the higher the
agent’s entitlement or the lower the persistence, the fewer units are needed.
Given any choice of U , finitely many consecutive reports of l or h suffice for the promised
utility to reach (µh, µl) or (0, 0).
29 By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, this implies that absorption
almost surely occurs. When we start from the optimal initial promise U∗ > U , both long-run
outcomes have strictly positive probability. However, unlike in the i.i.d. case, we cannot solve
for the absorption probabilities in closed form.
5.4 The Role of Persistence
Due to the high dimensionality of the principal’s program, it is difficult to establish compar-
ative statics analytically. However, it is straightforward to obtain them numerically.







n=0 with transition matrices P and P
′. If it is the case that
P ′ = P ω for some integer ω > 1, then the chain {vn}
∞





the latter can be interpreted as the same process as the former but sampled less frequently.
The i.i.d. case obtains in the limit when ω = ∞.30
As shown in figure 5, persistence hurts the principal. (The left-hand side shows that
the principal’s payoff, W (U∗), increases in ω.) It is not entirely obvious that persistence
hurts the principal, since persistence means that types are correlated over time, giving the
principal the ability to cross-check reports across rounds. However, with more persistent
values, the low type has less to gain from future units, as values in the near future are also
likely to be low. As a result, the principal must promise more of these future units to induce
truth-telling, leading to faster absorption into one of the inefficient eventual outcomes.31 On
29There exists a finite N such that for every U , if the current promise is U , either N consecutive l reports
suffice for the promise utility to reach (µh, µl) or N consecutive h reports suffice for the promise utility to
reach (0, 0).
30That is, provided the chain is irreducible and aperiodic.
31Nonetheless, it is not persistence per se but positive correlation that is detrimental. It is tempting to
think that any type of persistence is bad because the agent has private information that pertains not only
to today’s value but also to tomorrow’s, and eliciting private information is often costly. However, with
perfectly negatively-correlated types, the complete-information payoff is easily achieved: offer the agent a
choice between receiving the good in all odd or all even rounds. Since δ > l/h, truth-telling is optimal. Just
as in the case of a lower discount rate, a more negative correlation makes future promises into more effective
incentives because preference misalignment is short-lived.
26
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Figure 5: The value and the (discounted) time until absorption for (δ, l, h, c) = (.7, 1, 3, 2).
The transition matrix is ((.9, .1), (.1, .9))ω. The absorption time is denoted by τ .
the right-hand side of figure 5, we depict the expected (discounted) time until the process
{Un}
∞
n=0 is absorbed at (0, 0) or (µh, µl). This expected time until absorption measures how
long the relationship stays in the efficient phase. Figure 5 shows that the less persistent the
agent’s value is, the longer the efficient allocation is implemented.
The impact of persistence on the likelihood of each of these eventual outcomes and on the
agent’s overall utility is ambiguous. Martingale methods do not allow a simple formula as
in the i.i.d. case; indeed, unlike in the i.i.d. case, both the discount factor and the invariant
distribution affect this likelihood, as is readily verified via examples. When values are highly
persistent, the problem is close to the static one, in which the utility of the agent is either µ
or 0, according to whether granting the unit indiscriminately exceeds the cost of doing so.
Hence, persistence might either increase or decrease the likelihood of absorption at zero, as
well as the expected utility of the agent, depending on the payoff parameters.
We have omitted a discussion of other comparative statics. Indeed, they align with
intuition: the value W (U∗) increases with the discount factor δ, with probability ρl, as well
as with the high value h. However, the value is not monotone in l due to the following two
counteracting forces. On the one hand, as l increases, it becomes more difficult to induce
truth-telling by the low type. On the other, the principal has less to lose from serving a
low type. The impact on the value can be in either direction. Lastly, because the cost has
no impact on the agent’s incentives, it is easy to show analytically that the value W (U∗)
decreases in c.32
32Based on the results in the discrete-time model, we can extend the results to the continuous-time limit,
using a Poisson formulation. This formulation is available in section E of the online appendix. We choose
the discrete-time model because the continuous-time model admits no counterpart to the i.i.d. case and we
derive almost all our results in the discrete-time model.
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5.5 A Comparison with Dynamic Mechanisms with Transfers
In this section, we compare our results with those in the literature on dynamic mechanisms
with transfers by discussing the difference between our results and those in dynamic mech-
anism design with transfers. We emphasize that dynamic mechanisms without transfers
address different applications than do those with transfers. Yet, the comparison delineates
both the role of transfers in dynamic mechanism design, and the differences between these
two strands of literature.
One of the main findings of that literature (see Battaglini (2005), in particular, whose
model is exactly ours with transfers), “no distortion at the top,” has no counterpart here.
With transfers, efficient provision occurs forever once the agent first reports a high type. Fur-
thermore, even along the history in which efficiency is not achieved in finite time (namely,
in his model, after an uninterrupted string of low reports), efficiency is asymptotically ap-
proached. As explained above, we eventually obtain (with probability one) an inefficient
outcome, which can be implemented without further communication. Moreover, both long-
run outcomes can arise. In summary, with transfers, inefficiencies are frontloaded to the
greatest extent possible. Without transfers, they are backloaded.
The difference can be understood as follows. First, and importantly, results with transfers
rely on having revenue maximization be the objective. With transfers, efficiency is trivial:
simply charge the cost whenever the good is supplied. When revenue is maximized, transfers
reverse the incentive constraints: it is no longer the low type who would like to mimic the
high type but rather, the high type who would like to avoid paying his entire value for the
good by claiming that his type is low. The high type’s incentive constraint binds, and he
must be given information rents. Ideally, the principal would like to charge for these rents
before the agent has private information, when the expected value of these rents to the agent
is still common knowledge. When types are i.i.d., this poses no difficulty, and these rents can
be expropriated one round ahead of time. With correlation, however, different types value
these rents differently, since their likelihood of being high in the future depends on their
current types. However, when considering information rents sufficiently far in the future,
the initial type exerts a minimal effect on the expected value of these rents. Hence, the value
can almost be extracted. As a result, it is in the principal’s best interest to maximize the
surplus and offer a nearly efficient contract for all dates that are sufficiently far away.
Money plays two roles. First, because it is an instrument that allows promises to clear on
the spot without allocative distortions, it prevents the occurrence of backloaded inefficiencies
– a poor substitute for money in this regard. Even if payments could not be made in advance,
28
allowing for payments on the spot would suffice to restore efficiency if efficiency were the
goal. Another role of money is that it allows value to be transferred before information
becomes asymmetric. Hence, information rents no longer impede efficiency, at least with
respect to the remote future. These future inefficiencies are eliminated altogether.
A plausible intermediate case arises when money is available but the agent is protected by
limited liability, meaning that payments can be made only from the principal to the agent.
The principal maximizes the social surplus net of any payments.33 In this case, Lemma 7 in
appendix C shows that no transfers are made if (and only if) c− l < l. This condition can be
interpreted as follows: c− l is the cost to the principal of incurring one round of inefficiency
(i.e., supplying the good when the type is low), whereas l is the cost to the agent of forgoing
a low-value unit. Hence, if it is costlier to buy off the agent than to supply the good when
the value is low, the principal still prefers to follow the optimal policy without money.
6 Discussion
Here, we discuss some extensions that have not yet been addressed.
Moral hazard. As discussed in the introduction, the model can be extended to incorporate
moral hazard. Consider the following model of lending (see, e.g., Bulow and Rogoff, 1989):
the agent (the borrower) reports his type v ∈ {h, l}. The principal (the lender) decides
whether to grant the desired short-term loan. If the loan is granted, the agent can either
default or repay. If the agent repays, the principal’s and the agent’s payoffs are v− c and v.
If the agent defaults, the payoffs are v − c − η and v + β with η, β > 0. Here, η is the loss
to the principal if the agent defaults, and β is the agent’s benefit from defaulting.
We consider the first-best benchmark: the principal observes the agent’s type and dictates
the agent’s action. Let W (U) be the value function. The domain of U is now [0, µ + β],
where µ = qh+ (1− q)l.





; these are the payoff rates from granting the loan to a high type and a low type,
respectively. The third is − η
β
, which is the payoff rate from letting the agent default. Let




, such that granting the loan to a low type is more efficient than
letting him default. In this case, the first-best value function, W (U) for U ∈ [0, µ], is the
33If payments do not matter for the principal, efficiency is readily achieved because he could pay c to the
agent if the report is low and nothing otherwise.
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same as in the model without the default option. We can readily verify that the second-best
value function, W (U), is exactly the same as before, as long as the discount factor exceeds
some constant. Intuitively, the agent is deterred from defaulting if his promised utility is
large enough. At the same time, for U < U , the principal has flexibility in when to grant the
loan after high reports. In particular, if U is very small, the principal can freeze lending for
several rounds and let U move closer to U . She grants the loan only when U is close enough
to U . The agent will not default since defaulting will wipe out his promised utility.
Renegotiation-proofness. The optimal policy, as described in sections 4 and 5, is clearly
not renegotiation-proof. After a history of reports such that the promised utility is zero,
both parties would be better off by reneging and starting afresh. There are several ways
to define renegotiation-proofness. Strong renegotiation-proofness (Farrell and Maskin, 1989)
implies a lower boundary on the utility vectors visited (except in the event that µ is so low
that it makes the relationship altogether unprofitable, and thus, U∗ = 0.) However, the
structure of the optimal policy can still be derived from the same observations. The low-
type incentive-compatibility condition and promise keeping specify the continuation utilities,
unless a boundary is reached – regardless of whether it is the lower boundary (which must
serve as a lower reflecting boundary) or the upper absorbing boundary, µ.
More types. There is no conceptual difficulty in accommodating more than two types,
but the higher dimensionality makes it difficult to obtain an explicit solution that can be
easily described geometrically. Consider the case of three types, for instance. It is clear that
frontloading is the worst policy for the low type, given some promised utility to the high type,
and backloading is the best. But what maximizes a medium type’s utility, for some fixed pair
of the low type’s and the high type’s utilities? It appears that the convex hull of utilities from
frontloading and backloading policies traces out the lowest utility that a medium type can
obtain for any such pair, but the set of incentive-compatible utilities has full dimension. The
maximum utility of the medium type obtains when one of his incentive constraints binds, but
according to the binding constraint, there are two possibilities, yielding two corresponding
hypersurfaces. The analysis of the two-type case suggests that the optimal policy follows a
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A Proofs for section 4
Proof of Theorem 1. We have argued that ICl binds. Based on PK and the binding ICl,
we solve for Uh, Ul as a function of ph, pl and U :
Uh =




U − (1− δ)(phq(h− l) + pll)
δ
. (8)
We want to show that an optimal policy is such that (i) either Uh as defined in (7) equals 0
or ph = 1; and (ii) either Ul as defined in (8) equals µ or pl = 0. Write W (U ; ph, pl) for the
payoff from using ph, pl as probabilities of assigning the good, and using promised utilities as
given by (7)–(8). Substituting Uh and Ul into the optimality equation, we get that, from the
fundamental theorem of calculus, for any fixed ph < p
′
h such that the corresponding utilities
Uh, Ul are interior,




(1− δ)q {h− c− (1− q)(h− l)W ′(Ul)− µW
′(Uh)}dph.
This expression decreases (pointwise) in W ′(Uh) and W
′(Ul). Recall that W
′(U) is bounded
from above by 1 − c/h. Hence, plugging in the upper bound for W ′, we obtain that
W (U ; p′h, pl) − W (U ; ph, pl) > 0. It follows that there is no loss (and possibly a gain) in
increasing ph, unless feasibility prevents this. An entirely analogous reasoning implies that
W (U ; ph, pl) is nonincreasing in pl.
Both Uh, Ul decrease in ph, pl. Therefore, either Uh > 0 binds or ph equals 1. Similarly,
either Ul 6 µ binds or pl equals 0. The uniqueness for U > U follows from Lemma 2. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. We first prove that W is strictly concave on (U, µ). We begin with some



















We also write [a, b]h, [a, b]l for Ih, Il. Furthermore, given some interval I, we write ℓ(I) for
its length.




, for U ∈ I,
it holds that
W (U) = (1− δ)(qh− c) + δqW
(









and hence, over this interval, it follows by differentiation that, a.e. on I,
W ′(U) = qW ′(Uh) + (1− q)W
′(Ul).




, for U ∈ I,
W (U) = (1− q)
(




+ (1− δ)q(µ− c) + δqW
(





W ′(U) = (1− q)(1− c/l) + qW ′(Uh).




, with the convention that its slope at Ul = µ is given by 1 − c/l. By weak concavity
of W , if W is affine on I, then it must be affine on both Ih and Il (with the convention that
it is trivially affine at µ). We make the following observations.
1. For any I ⊆ (U, µ) (of positive length) such that W is affine on I, ℓ(Ih∩I) = ℓ(Il∩I) =
0. If not, then we note that, because the slope on I is the average of the other two, all
three must have the same slope (since two intersect, and so have the same slope). But
then the convex hull of the three has the same slope (by weak concavity). We thus
obtain an interval I ′ = co{Il, Ih} of strictly greater length (note that ℓ(Ih) = ℓ(I)/δ,






intersect I ′, and we can repeat this operation. This contradicts the fact the slope of
W on [0, U ] is (1− c/h), yet W (µ) = µ− c.
2. It follows that there is no interval I ⊆ [U, µ] on which W has slope (1− c/h) (because
then W would have this slope on I ′ := co{{U} ∪ I}, and yet I ′ would intersect I ′l .)
Similarly, there cannot be an interval I ⊆ [U, µ] on which W has slope 1− c/l.
3. It immediately follows from 2 that W < W on (U, µ): if there is a U ∈ (U, µ) such that
W (U) = W (U), then by concavity again (and the fact that the two slopes involved
are the two possible values of the slope of W ), W must either have slope (1− c/h) on
[0, U ], or (1− c/l) on [U, µ], both being impossible.
4. Next, suppose that there exists an interval I ⊂ [U, µ) of length ε > 0 such that W is
affine on I. There might be many such intervals; consider the one with the smallest
lower extremity. Furthermore, without loss, given this lower extremity, pick I so that
it has maximum length, that W is affine on I, but on no proper superset of I. Let
I := [a, b]. We claim that Ih ∈ [0, U ]. Suppose not. Note that Ih cannot overlap with
I (by point 1). Hence, either Ih is contained in [0, U ], or it is contained in [U, a], or
U ∈ (a, b)h. This last possibility cannot occur, because W must be affine on (a, b)h,
yet the slope on (ah, U) is equal to (1 − c/h), while by point 2 it must be strictly less
on (U, bh). It cannot be contained in [U, a], because ℓ(Ih) = ℓ(I)/δ > ℓ(I), and this
would contradict the hypothesis that I was the lowest interval in [U, µ] of length ε over
which W is affine.
It follows from 1 that Il cannot intersect I. Assume b 6 U . Hence, we have that Il is an
interval over which W is affine, and such that ℓ(Il) = ℓ(I)/δ. Let ε
′ := ℓ(I)/δ. By the
same reasoning as before, we can find I ′ ⊂ [U, µ) of length ε′ > 0 such that W is affine
on I ′, and such that I ′h ⊂ [0, U ]. Repeating the same argument as often as necessary,
we conclude that there must be an interval J ⊂ [U, µ) such that (i) W is affine on J ,
J = [a′, b′], b′ > U , (ii) there exists no interval of equal or greater length in [U, µ) over
which W would be affine. By the same argument yet again, Jh must be contained in
[0, U ]. Yet the assumption that δ > 1/2 is equivalent to Uh =
U−(1−δ)µ
δ
> U , and so
this is a contradiction. Hence, there exists no interval in (U, µ) over which W is affine,
and so W must be strictly concave.
The rest of the proof shows that W is differentiable. Since W is differentiable on U ∈
[0, U), we focus on U ∈ [U, µ]. We let w−(U) be the left derivative of W (U), and w+(U) the
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right derivative. Concavity of W implies that (i) both w− and w+ are monotone decreasing,
(ii) w−(U) > w+(U), ∀U , and (iii) w+(U) > w−(U ′), ∀U ′ > U . We also know that w−(µ) =
l−c
l








We first argue that W is differentiable at U . Since W = W for U ∈ [0, U ], w−(U) = h−c
h
.
On the other hand,
w+(U) = qw+(Uh(U)) + (1− q)w
+(Ul(U)).
Since Ul(U) = U and Uh(U) < U , we have




This shows that W is differentiable at U .
If w− = w+ for all U , then W is differentiable. Suppose that w− (U ′) − w+ (U ′) > 0 for
some U ′. Then there are only finitely many utility levels at which the difference (w− − w+)
is weakly larger than the difference at U ′. We let K = maxU (w
−(U)− w+(U)), and A =
{U : w−(U) − w+(U) = K}. We next argue that the presumption that K > 0 and A 6= ∅
leads to a contradiction.






. Moreover, Uh(U) 6 U . This implies that
















The last step follows from the fact that w−(Uh(U)) = w
+(Uh(U)) for all Uh(U) 6 U .
This implies that A ∩ [U, (1− δ)l + U ] = ∅. Otherwise, if there is some U ∈ A ∩
[U, (1− δ)l + U ], then the difference (w− − w+) at Ul(U) is greater than K.






, Ul(U) = µ.
For U ∈ (δl + U, µ], we have
















For U = δl + U , w+(U) is given by the same formula as in (11). On the other hand,




This means that (12) applies to U = δl + U as well. Based on (12), we conclude that
A∩ [δl+U, µ] = ∅. Otherwise, if there is some U ∈ A∩ [δl+U, µ], then the difference
(w− − w+) at Uh(U) is greater than K.






. This implies that











Therefore, if U ∈ A ∩ ((1− δ)l + U, δl + U), then Uh(U), Ul(U) must be in A as well.
Let Ũ be the maximal utility in A ∩ ((1− δ)l + U, δl + U). Then this leads to a
contradiction: (i) either Ul(Ũ) is also in A ∩ ((1− δ)l + U, δl + U), which contradicts
the presumption that Ũ is the maximum, (ii) or Ul(Ũ) is in [δl+U, µ], which contradicts
the conclusion that A ∩ [δl + U, µ] = ∅ in the previous step.

Lemma 5. W has a unique maximizer, U∗ = argmaxU W (U). U
∗ is nonincreasing in c.
Proof. Uniqueness of U∗ follows from strict concavity of W on [U, µ]. Consider now (9)–(10):
replace the function W that appears on the right-hand side with a function Wn, define the
left-hand side Wn+1 iteratively, and set W0 = 0 identically. By induction, the function Wn
admits a cross-partial in (U, c) a.e., which is nonpositive (note that the “flow payoff” in (10)
involves a negative cross-partial term −(1− q)/l. It follows by convergence of Wn to W that
W has a nonpositive cross-partial (a.e.) as well, implying that U∗ is nonincreasing in c. 
B Proofs for section 5
Proof of Lemma 4. We focus on the case with 1− ρh > ρl. We first make a few observations
about V :
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1. Because (0, 0) is delivered by never providing the good and (µh, µl) is delivered by
always providing the good, (0, 0) and (µh, µl) are the lowest and highest utility pairs
that the principal can deliver. It follows that V ⊂ [0, µh] × [0, µl]. Moreover, for any
(U(h), U(l)) ∈ V , 0 < U(h) < µh if and only if 0 < U(l) < µl.
2. Payoffs in co{bm, fm : m > 0} can be implemented without eliciting the agent’s infor-
mation. It follows that co{bm, fm : m > 0} ⊂ V .
3. The set V is convex, because any convex combination of U, U ′ ∈ V can be implemented
by flipping a coin before round zero.
4. Let SE(x) := min(x,U(l))∈V U(l) and NW (x) := max(x,U(l))∈V U(l). Then SE(x) and
NW (x) are the lowest and the highest payoffs to a current low type, given that a
current high type gets x. The convexity of V implies that SE(·) is convex and NW (·)
is concave.
5. We next argue that SE(x) = l
h
x for x ∈ [0, (1−δ)h]. First, SE(x) 6 l
h
x for x ∈ [0, (1−
δ)h] because the principal can provide the good in the current round with probability
x
(1−δ)h
. Second, we argue that SE(x) cannot be lower than l
h
x. For any policy that gives
a current high type x, a current low type can secure l
h
x by reporting in the same way
as the current high type does. This is because the current low type’s and the current
high type’s future values converge, and the ratio of their future values is larger than
l
h
. A similar argument shows that NW (x) = µl+
l
h
(x−µh) for x ∈ [µh− (1− δ)h, µh].
6. Throughout the proof, we let SE ′(·) be the right-derivative and NW ′(·) be the left-
derivative. It follows from (4.) and (5.) that SE ′(·) > l
h
and NW ′(·) > l
h
.




s.t., x = (1− δ)phh+ δ ((1− ρh)Uh(h) + ρhUh(l))
> (1− δ)plh + δ ((1− ρh)Ul(h) + ρhUl(l))
U(l) = (1− δ)pll + δ (ρlUl(h) + (1− ρl)Ul(l))
> (1− δ)phl + δ (ρlUh(h) + (1− ρl)Uh(l)) .
The four constraints are PKh, ICh, PKl, ICl, respectively. Because we assume that x ∈
(0, µh), the minimal U(l) must be strictly positive. It follows that in the solution either
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pl > 0 or Ul > (0, 0). We make three observations regarding the solution of this program:
1. ICl must bind. If not, we can reduce pl or Ul. This has no impact on PKh and makes
ICh easier to satisfy. This reduction will lower the objective U(l).
2. Uh must be on the lower boundary SE(·). If not, we can replace Uh with
(




for small ε > 0. This has no impact on the promised utility to the current high type,
and thus no impact on PKh, ICh. This lowers the RHS of ICl, so allows us to lower
the objective U(l).
3. Either ph = 1 or Uh = (0, 0). If not, we can replace ph, Uh with
ph = ph +
δ(h(1− ρh) + lρh)
(1− δ)h2




This change has no impact on PKh, ICh, but lowers the RHS of ICl. Hence, we can
further lower the objective U(l). We can replace Uh with the new utility pair because
we have shown that SE ′(·) is at least l
h
.
These observations show that the utility pair (x, SE(x)) is delivered by a policy in which
(i) the current low type is indifferent between reporting low and high, (ii) the continuation
utility pair after high report is still on the lower boundary SE(·), (iii) ph is as high as possible.
Combining (i) and (ii), we conclude that the current low type’s payoff can be calculated as
if he always reports high. According to (iii), the good is provided as long as possible after
high reports. This shows that the lower boundary SE(·) is characterized by the frontloading
policies.
Using a similar argument, we next show that NW (·) is given by the backloading policies.
For any x ∈ (0, µl), NW




s.t., U(h) = (1− δ)phh+ δ ((1− ρh)Uh(h) + ρhUh(l))
> (1− δ)plh + δ ((1− ρh)Ul(h) + ρhUl(l))
x = (1− δ)pll + δ (ρlUl(h) + (1− ρl)Ul(l))
> (1− δ)phl + δ (ρlUh(h) + (1− ρl)Uh(l)) .
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Because we assume that x ∈ (0, µl), the minimal U(h) must be strictly positive. It follows
that in the solution either ph > 0 or Uh > (0, 0). We again make three observations:
1. ICh must bind. If not, we can reduce ph or Uh. This has no impact on PKl and makes
ICl easier to satisfy. This reduction will lower the objective U(h).
2. Ul must be on the upper boundary NW (·). If not, we can replace Ul with
(




for small ε > 0. This has no impact on the promised utility to the current low type,
and thus no impact on PKl, ICl. This lowers the RHS of ICh, so allows us to lower
the objective U(h).
3. Either pl = 0 or Ul = (µh, µl). If not, we can replace pl, Ul with
pl = pl −
δ(hρl + l(1− ρl))
(1− δ)hl




This change has no impact on PKl, ICl, but lowers the RHS of ICh. Hence, we can
further lower the objective U(h). We can replace Ul with the new utility pair because
we have shown that NW ′(·) is at least l
h
.
These observations show that the utility pair (NW−1(x), x) is delivered by a policy in which
(i) the current high type is indifferent between reporting low and high, (ii) the continuation
utility pair after low report is still on the upper boundary NW (·), (iii) pl is as low as possible.
This shows that the upper boundary SE(·) is characterized by the backloading policies. 
B.1 The General Solution
Theorem 2 follows from the analysis of the optimal policy on the entire domain V . Here, we
solve the program in section 5.1 for the entire V .
We further divide V into subsets and introduce two sequences of utility vectors. First,
given U , define the sequence {vm}m>0 by
vmh = E [δ
mU(vm) | v0 = h] , v
m
l = E [δ
mU(vm) | v0 = l] . (13)
Intuitively, this is the payoff from waiting for m rounds from initial value h or l, and then
getting U . (See Footnote 24 for the definition of U .) Let V be the payoff vectors in V that
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lie below the graph of the set of points {vm}m>0. Figure 6 illustrates this construction. Note
that V has a nonempty interior if and only if ρl is sufficiently large (see (4)). This set is
the domain of utilities for which the complete-information payoff can be achieved, as stated
below.
Lemma 6. For all U ∈ V ∪ {(µh, µl)} and all φ,
W (U, φ) =W (U, φ).
Conversely, if U /∈ V ∪ {(µh, µl)}, then W (U, φ) < W (U, φ) for all φ ∈ (0, 1) when δ > δ,
where δ is given by the condition that b1h = v
∗
h.
To understand Lemma 6, we first observe that if the agent is promised U , his future
promised utility after a low report is exactly U under the optimal policy. Therefore, for any
U that is on the frontloading boundary of V and lies below U , the complete-information
payoff can be achieved. Second, for any m > 1, the utility vm can be delivered by not
supplying the unit in the current round and setting the future utility to be vm−1, regardless
of the report. The agent’s promised utility becomes U(= v0) after m rounds. From this point
on, the optimal policy as specified in Theorem 2 is implemented. Clearly, under this policy,
the unit is never supplied when the agent’s value is low. Therefore, the complete-information
payoff is achieved.
Second, we define ûm := (ûmh , û
m






δnvn | v0 = h
]





δnvn | v0 = l
]
. (14)
This is the utility vector if the principal supplies the unit from round 1 to round m, inde-
pendently of the reports. Note that the unit is not supplied in round zero. We note that
û0 = (0, 0) and ûm is an increasing sequence (in both coordinates) contained in V , where
limm→∞ û
m = b1. The sequence {ûm}m>0 defines a polygonal chain P that divides V \ V
into two subsets, Vb and Vf , consisting of those points in V \ V that lie above or below P .
We also let Pf , Pb be the (closure of the) polygonal chains defined by {f
m}m>0 and {b
m}m>0
that correspond to the frontloading and backloading boundaries of V .
We now define a policy (which, as we will see below, is optimal) ignoring for the present
the choice of the initial promise.
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and Uh ∈ Pf . If U ∈ Vf , then Ul ∈ Pf . If U ∈ Vb, Ul is chosen such that ICh binds. (This
implies that Ul ∈ Pb for U ∈ Pb.)
For any U , the current allocation is the efficient one (as long as possible), and the future
utilities Uh and Ul are chosen so that PKh and PKl are satisfied. We will show that the
closer U is to the frontloading boundary of V , the higher the principal’s payoff is. Therefore,
Uh and Ul shall be as close to Pf as ICl and ICh permit. One can always choose Uh to be
on Pf , because moving Uh toward Pf makes ICl less binding. However, one cannot always
choose Ul to be on Pf without violating ICh, because the high type might have an incentive
to mimic the low type as we increase Ul(h) and decrease Ul(l). This is where the definition
of P plays the role. If the promised utility is (ûmh , û
m
l ) ∈ P , the high type is promised the
expected utility from forgoing the unit in round zero and consuming the unit from round 1
to m. Therefore, if the low type consumes no unit in the current round and is promised a
future utility that is on the frontloading boundary, ICh holds with equality. Hence, for all
utilities above P , Ul is chosen such that ICh binds, whereas for all utilities below P , one
chooses Ul to be on the frontloading boundary. It is readily verified that the policy and
choices of Ul, Uh also imply that ICl binds for all U ∈ Pf .
This policy is independent of the principal’s belief (see also Footnote 18). That is, the
belief regarding the agent’s type today does not enter the optimal policy, for a fixed promised
utility. However, the belief affects the optimal initial promise and the payoff.
Figure 6 illustrates the dynamics. Given any promised utility vector U ∈ V \ V , the
vector (ph, pl) = (1, 0) is used (unless U is too close to (0, 0) or (µh, µl)), and promised
utilities depend on the report. A report of l shifts the utility to the right (toward higher
values), whereas a report of h shifts it to the left and to the frontloading boundary. Below
the interior polygonal chain, utility jumps to the frontloading boundary after an l report;
above it, the jump is determined by ICh. If the utility starts from the frontloading boundary,
the continuation utility after an l report stays there.
For completeness, we also define the subsets over which promise keeping prevents the
efficient choices (ph, pl) = (1, 0) from being made. Let Vh = {U : U ∈ V, U(l) > b
1
l } and
Vl = {U : U ∈ V, U(h) 6 f
1
h}. It is easily verified that (ph, pl) = (1, 0) is feasible at U given
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Figure 6: Incentive-compatible set V and the optimal policy for (δ, ρh, ρl, l, h) =
(9/10, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1).
Theorem 3. For any U ∈ V , the policy in Definition 2 is optimal. The initial promise U∗
is in Pf ∩ (V \ V ), with U
∗ increasing in the principal’s prior belief.
Furthermore, the value function W (U(h), U(l), φ) is weakly increasing in U(h) along the
rays x = φU(h) + (1− φ)U(l) for any φ ∈ {1− ρh, ρl}.
Given that U∗ ∈ Pf and given the structure of the optimal policy, the promised utility
vector never leaves Pf . It is also simple to verify that, as in the i.i.d. case (and by the same
arguments), the (one-sided) derivative of W approaches the derivative of W as U approaches
either (µh, µl) or the set V . As a result, the initial promise U
∗ is in Pf ∩ (V \ V ).
Proof of Lemma 6. It will be useful in this proof and those that follow to define the operator
Bij for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Given an arbitrary A ⊂ [0, µh]× [0, µl], let
Bij(A) := {U ∈ [0, µh]× [0, µl] : Uh, Ul ∈ A solving (PKh)–(ICl) for (ph, pl) = (i, j)} ,
and similarly Bi·(A),B·j(A) when only ph or pl is constrained.
The first step is to compute V0, the largest set such that V0 ⊂ B·0(V0). Plainly, this is a
proper subset of V , because any promise U(l) ∈ (b1l , µl] requires that pl be strictly positive.
We first show that V ⊂ V0. Substituting the probability of being h in roundm conditional
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on the current type into (13), we obtain the analytic expression of {vm}m>0:
vmh = δ
m ((1− q)U(l) + qU(h) + (1− q)(1− ρh − ρl)
m(U(h)− U(l))) ,
vml = δ
m ((1− q)U(l) + qU(h)− q(1− ρh − ρl)
m(U(h)− U(l))) .
Note that the sequence {vm}m>0 solves the system of equations, for all m > 0:











and v1l = v
0
l (which is easily verified given the conditions that v
0 = U and that U lies on the
line U(l) = δρl
1−δ(1−ρl)
U(h)). First, for any m > 1, vm can be supported by setting ph = pl = 0
and Uh = Ul = v
m−1. Therefore, vm can be delivered with pl being 0 and continuation
utilities in V . Second, we show that v0 can itself be obtained with continuation utilities in
V . This one is obtained by setting (ph, pl) = (1, 0), setting ICl as a binding constraint, and
Ul = v
0 (again one can check that Uh is in V and that ICh holds). Third, for any U ∈ Pf ∩V ,
U can be delivered with pl being 0 and continuation utilities on Pf ∩ V . This shows that
V ⊆ V0, because the extreme points of V can be supported with pl being 0 and continuation
utilities in V , and all other utility vectors in V can be written as a convex combination of
these extreme points.
We next show that V0 ⊂ V . Consider a sequence of programs by setting Z
0 = V and defin-
ing recursively the supremum score in direction (λ1, λ2) given Z
m−1 as K((λ1, λ2), Z
m−1) =
supph,pl,Uh,Ul λ1U(h) + λ2U(l), subject to (PKh)–(ICl), pl = 0, ph ∈ [0, 1], Uh, Ul ∈ Z
m−1,
λ · Uh 6 λ · U and λ · Ul 6 λ · U . Let the set B(Z








and the set Zm = B(Zm−1) obtains by considering an appropriate choice of λ1, λ2. More
precisely, we always set λ2 = 1, and for m = 1, pick λ1 = 0. This gives Z
1 = V ∩{U : U(l) 6









and as a result obtain that
V0 ⊆ Z
m = Zm−1 ∩
{










It follows that V0 ⊂ V .
Next, we argue that the complete-information payoff is achieved in V . It is clear that
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any policy that never gives the unit to the low type must be optimal. This is a feature of
the policies that we have described to obtain the boundary of V .
Finally, one must show that the complete-information payoff cannot be achieved for
U /∈ V ∪ {(µh, µl)}.
1. Since V is the largest fixed point of B·0, starting from any utility U /∈ V , there is a
positive probability that the unit is given (after some history that has positive proba-
bility) to the low value. This implies that the complete-information payoff cannot be
achieved for U 6 v∗, U /∈ V .
2. For U > v∗, achieving the complete-information payoff requires that the agent gets
the unit whenever he reports h. This means that the agent can report h and get the
unit all the time. The agent’s interim utility is effectively (µh, µl). Therefore, the
complete-information payoff is achieved only at U = (µh, µl).
3. We are left with U ∈ V such that U(l) > v∗l and U(h) < v
∗
h. Given that U(l) > v
∗
l ,
the complete-information requires that if the agent reports low today, then he gets the
unit after the high report from tomorrow on. This implies that the agent will get at
least b1 as his interim utilities, contradicting the presumption that U(h) < v∗h since
v∗h 6 b
1
h when δ is high enough.

Proof of Theorem 2 and 3. Part I: We first examine a relaxed problem in which ICh is
dropped. We define the function W̃ : V × {ρl, 1 − ρh} → R ∪ {−∞}, that solves the
following program: for any U ∈ V, φ ∈ {ρl, 1− ρh},








(1− δ)pl(l − c) + δW̃ (Ul, ρl)
)
,
over ph, pl ∈ [0, 1] and Uh, Ul ∈ V , subject to PKh, PKl, ICl. Given that ICh is dropped,
this is a relaxed version of the original problem. It holds that W̃ (U, φ) > W (U, φ) for any
U ∈ V, φ ∈ {ρl, 1− ρh}.
We want to show that the value function W̃ satisfies two properties (I) and (II):
(I) W̃ (U(h), U(l), 1− ρh) is weakly increasing in U(h) along the rays x = (1− ρh)U(h) +
ρhU(l), and W̃ (U(h), U(l), ρl) is weakly increasing in U(h) along the rays y = ρlU(h)+
(1− ρl)U(l);
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(II) Given W̃ , we define two functions w̃h(x) and w̃l(y). Let (Uh1(x), Ul1(x)) be the in-
tersection of Pf and the line x = (1 − ρh)U(h) + ρhU(l). We define w̃h(x) :=
W̃ (Uh1(x), Ul1(x), 1−ρh) on the domain [0, (1−ρh)µh+ρhµl]. Similarly, (Uh2(y), Ul2(y))
denotes the intersection of Pf and the line y = ρlU(h) + (1 − ρl)U(l). We define
w̃l(y) := W̃ (Uh2(y), Ul2(y), ρl) on the domain [0, ρlµh + (1 − ρl)µl]. For any U , let
X(U) = (1 − ρh)U(h) + ρhU(l) and Y (U) = ρlU(h) + (1 − ρl)U(l). We want to show




l are in [1− c/l, 1− c/h] (through-
out this proof, derivatives have to be understood as either right- or left-derivatives,




If W̃ satisfies (I) and (II), then it follows that for the relaxed problem, for any U :
1. It is optimal to choose Uh and Ul that lie on Pf . First, for any U ∈ V , it is feasible to
choose a Uh on Pf since the intersection of ICl and PKh is above Pf . It is also feasible
to choose a Ul on Pf since ICh is dropped. Given property (I), the principal prefers to
have Uh, Ul as close to Pf as possible.
2. It is optimal to choose ph, pl as in (15), i.e., to choose ph and pl as efficiently as possible.
This is due to property (II.b) that w′h, w
′
l are in [1− c/l, 1− c/h].
Next, we show that W̃ satisfies (I) and (II) by an argument of value function iterations.
Let W be the set of all functions Ŵ (U, 1− ρh) and Ŵ (U, ρl) that satisfy (I) and (II). More
specifically,
1. Ŵ (U(h), U(l), 1− ρh) is weakly increasing in U(h) along the rays x = (1− ρh)U(h) +
ρhU(l), and Ŵ (U(h), U(l), ρl) is weakly increasing in U(h) along the rays y = ρlU(h)+
(1− ρl)U(l);
2. We define ŵh and ŵl given Ŵ (U, 1− ρh) and Ŵ (U, ρl) in the same way as in (II). The
functions ŵh and ŵl satisfy (II.a)-(II.c).
We next show that, if we use some Ŵ ∈ W as the principal’s continuation value function,
then the new value function, denoted by Ŵ , still satisfies properties (I) and (II). On the
other hand, properties (I) and (II) are closed under value function iterations. This proves
that the value function of the relaxed problem, W̃ , is in W.
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1. We define ŵh and ŵl given Ŵ (U, 1− ρh) and Ŵ (U, ρl) in the same way as in (II). We
first show that ŵh and ŵl satisfy properties (II.a)-(II.c). For any U ∈ Pf \ (V ∪ Vh), a
high report leads to Uh such that (1−ρh)Uh(h)+ρhUh(l) = (U(h)− (1−δ)h)/δ and Uh
is lower than U . Also, a low report leads to Ul such that ρlUl(h)+(1−ρl)Ul(l) = U(l)/δ
and Ul is higher than U given that U ∈ Pf \ (V ∪ Vh). We thus have
Ŵ (U, 1− ρh) = (1− ρh)
(
(1− δ)(h− c) + δŴ (Uh, 1− ρh)
)
+ ρhδŴ (Ul, ρl),
Ŵ (U, ρl) = ρl
(
(1− δ)(h− c) + δŴ (Uh, 1− ρh)
)
+ (1− ρl)δŴ (Ul, ρl).
Let x = X(U) and y = Y (U). It follows that
(Uh1(x), Ul1(x)) = (Uh2(y), Ul2(y)) = (U(h), U(l)). (17)
Given the definition of ŵh, ŵl, ŵh, ŵl, we have







































Given that ŵ′h(X(U)) > ŵ
′
l(Y (U)) for any U , that ŵh, ŵl are concave, and that Uh is



















h2(y) + (1− ρl)U
′





h2(y) > 0. (21)
This can be shown by assuming that U is on some line segment U(h) = aU(l) + b.
(Recall that Pf is piecewise linear.) For any a > 0, the conditions (20) and (21) hold.
Given (18), (20), and ŵ′h, ŵ
′




l ∈ [1−c/l, 1−c/h].
Given (17) to (21), we obtain that ŵ′h(X(U)) > ŵ
′
h(Y (U)) for any U ∈ Pf \ (V ∪ Vh).
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The concavity of ŵh, ŵl can be shown by taking the derivative of (18):














































Here, we use the fact that Uh1(x), Ul1(x) (or Uh2(y), Ul2(y)) are piece-wise linear in x
(or y).
The analysis for U ∈ Pf ∩ Vh is similar. The only difference is that Ul equals (µh, µl)
and that the good is supplied with positive probability after the low report. We omit
the details for this case.
To sum up, if ŵh, ŵl satisfy properties (II.a), (II.b) and (II.c), then ŵh, ŵl also satisfy
these properties.
2. We next show that Ŵ satisfies (I). We first focus on the region U ∈ V \ (V ∪ Vh ∪ Vl).
We need to show, for φ ∈ {1− ρh, ρl}, that:







−Ŵ (U, φ), where ε > 0.
(22)





Ũh(h), Ũh(l), 1− ρh
)
− Ŵ (Uh(h), Uh(l), 1− ρh)
)
, (23)
where Ũh and Uh are on Pf and
(1− δ)h+ δ
(
(1− ρh)Ũh(h) + ρhŨh(l)
)
= U(h) + ε,
(1− δ)h+ δ ((1− ρh)Uh(h) + ρhUh(l)) = U(h).











where Ũl and Ul are on Pf and
δ
(






δ (ρlUl(h) + (1− ρl)Ul(l)) = U(l).
We need to show that (23) is greater than (24). Note that Uh, Ũh, Ul, Ũl are on Pf , so
only the properties of ŵh, ŵl are needed. Taking the limit as ε goes to 0, we obtain











, ∀U ∈ V \ (V ∪ Vh ∪ Vl). (25)




l are decreasing. Therefore, we only need to show
that inequality (25) holds when U is on Pf , since any U ∈ Pf gives the highest U(h)
(among vectors in V ) for a fixed U(l). The inequality (25) holds given that (i) ŵh, ŵl
are concave; (ii) inequality (16) holds; (iii) (U(h)− (1− δ)h)/δ corresponds to a lower
point on Pf than U(l)/δ does. When U ∈ Vh, the right-hand side of (22) is given by
φε(1− c/l). Inequality (22) is equivalent to ŵ′h((U(h)− (1− δ)h)/δ) > 1− c/l, which
is obviously true. Similar analysis applies to the case in which U ∈ Vl.
This shows that the value function for the relaxed problem W̃ is in W. If the initial promise
is on Pf , then the continuation utility never leaves Pf . Moreover, for U ∈ Pf , ICh never
binds under the optimal policy of the relaxed problem. This implies that W = W̃ for any
U ∈ Pf .
Part II: We turn to the original optimization problem by adding back the constraint ICh.
The first observation is that we can decompose the optimization problem into two subprob-
lems: (i) choose ph, Uh to maximize (1 − δ)ph(h− c) + δW (Uh, 1− ρh) subject to PKh and
ICl; (ii) choose pl, Ul to maximize (1− δ)pl(l − c) + δW (Ul, ρl) subject to PKl and ICh.
1. We want to show that the policy in Definition 2 with respect to ph, Uh is the optimal
solution to the first subproblem. First, we have shown at the beginning of this proof
that it is feasible to choose Uh on Pf so that PKh and ICl are satisfied. If we take W̃
as the continuation value function, the policy in Definition 2 is optimal. Given that (i)
W̃ is weakly higher than W pointwise, and (ii) W̃ coincides with W on Pf , the policy
in Definition 2 with respect to ph, Uh solves the first subproblem.
2. For the second subproblem, if the principal chooses pl, Ul subject to PKl so that Ul ∈ Pf
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and pl is as low as possible, then ICh will not bind for U ∈ Vf and will bind for U ∈ Vb.
(This follows from the definition of P, Vf , Vb.) This shows that for any U ∈ Vf , the
policy in Definition 2 is optimal, because (i) W̃ is weakly higher than W pointwise,
and (ii) W̃ coincides with W on Pf . This also implies that for any U ∈ Vb, ICh must
bind. We want to show that for U ∈ Vb, it is optimal to choose the lowest possible pl.
For a fixed U ∈ Vb, PKl and a binding ICh determines Ul(h), Ul(l) as a function of pl.
Let γh, γl denote the derivative of Ul(h), Ul(l) with respect to pl
γh =
(1− δ)(lρh − h(1− ρl))
δ(1− ρh − ρl)
, γl =
(1− δ)(hρl − l(1 − ρh))
δ(1− ρh − ρl)
.
Given that ρl + ρh < 1, it follows that γh < 0. We want to show that it is optimal to
set pl as low as possible. That is, the principal’s payoff from the low type, (1− δ)pl(l−











where the left-hand side is the directional derivative of W (U, ρl) along the vector
(γh, γl). We first show that (26) holds for all U ∈ Pf \ (Vh ∪ Vl). For any fixed
U ∈ Pf \ (Vh ∪ Vl), we have
W (U, ρl) = ρl
(











It follows that ∂W/∂U(h) = ρlw̃
′
h and ∂W/∂U(l) = (1 − ρl)w̃
′












it is sufficient to show that (26) holds when either (i) w̃′l = w̃
′
h, or (ii) w̃
′
l = 1 − c/l.
In case (i), the left-hand side of (26) equals −(1 − δ)lw̃′h/δ, so (26) holds for any
w̃′h ∈ [1 − c/l, 1 − c/h]. In case (ii), the left-hand side of (26) decreases in w̃
′
h and is




h = 1 − c/l, we obtain that (26)
holds. (Using similar arguments, we can show that (26) holds for all U ∈ Pf ∩ Vh or
U ∈ Pf ∩ Vl.)
Lastly, we want to show that (26) holds for U ∈ Vb. Note that W (U, ρl) is concave on
V . Therefore, its directional derivative along the vector (γh, γl) is monotone. For any
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The last inequality follows as w̃h, w̃l are concave. Given that (γh, γl) points towards the
interior of V , (26) holds within V . This part of the proof also shows that W coincides
with W̃ on Vf . Since W is concave on V , W also satisfies property (I).
Part III: We next show that the optimal initial promise is on Pf and increases in the prior
belief of the high type. For any x ∈ [0, (1 − ρh)µh + ρhµl], let z(x) be ρlUh1(x) + (1 −
ρl)Ul1(x). The function z(x) is piecewise linear with z
′ being positive and increasing in x.
Let φ0 denote the prior belief of the high type. We want to show that the maximum of
φ0W (U, 1− ρh)+ (1−φ0)W (U, ρl) is achieved on Pf for any prior φ0. Suppose not. Suppose
Ũ ∈ V \ Pf achieves the maximum. Let U
0 (or U1) denote the intersection of Pf and
(1−ρh)U(h)+ρhU(l) = (1−ρh)Ũ(h)+ρhŨ(l) (or ρlU(h)+(1−ρl)U(l) = ρlŨ(h)+(1−ρl)Ũ(l)).
Given that ρl < 1 − ρh, it follows that U
0 < U1. Given that Ũ achieves the maximum, it
must be true that
W (U1, 1− ρh)−W (U
0, 1− ρh) < 0,
W (U1, ρl)−W (U
0, ρl) > 0.
We show that this is impossible by arguing that for any U0, U1 ∈ Pf and U
0 < U1, W (U1, 1−
ρh)−W (U
0, 1−ρh) < 0 implies that W (U
1, ρl)−W (U
0, ρl) < 0. It is without loss to assume
that U0, U1 are on the same line segment U(h) = aU(l) + b. Hence,
W (U1, 1− ρh)−W (U




W (U1, ρl)−W (U





where s0 = (1−ρh)U
0(h)+ρhU
0(l), s1 = (1−ρh)U
1(h)+ρhU
1(l). Given that w̃′h(s) > w̃
′
l(z(s))
and z′(s) > 0,
∫ s1
s0




w̃′l(z(s))ds < 0. This shows the optimal
initial promise is on Pf .
The optimal U∗ is chosen such that X(U∗) maximizes φ0w̃h(x) + (1− φ0)w̃l(z(x)) which
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According to (16), we know that w̃′h(X(U
∗)) > 0 > w̃′l(z(X(U
∗))). Therefore, the derivative
above is weakly positive for any φ′0 > φ0. Hence, the optimal initial promise given φ
′
0 must
be higher than U∗, the optimal initial promise given φ0. 
C Transfers with Limited Liability
Here, we consider the case in which only the principal can pay the agent. The principal
maximizes his payoff net of payments. The following lemma shows that transfers occur on
the equilibrium path when c− l is higher than l.
Lemma 7. The principal makes transfers on path if and only if c− l > l.
Proof. We first show that the principal makes transfers if c−l > l. Suppose not. The optimal
mechanism is the same as the one characterized in Theorem 1. When U is sufficiently close
to µ, we want to show that it is “cheaper” to provide incentives using transfers. Given the
optimal allocation (ph, Uh) and (pl, Ul), if we reduce Ul by ε and make a transfer of δε/(1−δ)
to the low type, the ICl/PK constraints are satisfied. When Ul is sufficiently close to µ, the
principal’s payoff increment is close to δ(c/l−1)ε− δε = δ(c/l−2), which is strictly positive
if c − l > l. This contradicts the fact that the allocation (ph, Uh) and (pl, Ul) is optimal.
Therefore, the principal makes transfers if c− l > l.
If c − l 6 l, the principal’s complete-information payoff, if U ∈ [0, µ] and c − l 6 l, is
the same as W in Lemma 1. We argue that for U ∈ [0, µ], the principal’s value function
is the same as before. This trivially holds for U = 0, µ. We first show that the principal
never makes transfers if Ul, Uh < µ. With abuse of notation, let tv denote the current-round
transfer after v report. Suppose Uv < µ and tv > 0. We can increase Uv (v = l or h) by ε and
reduce tv by δε/(1 − δ). This adjustment has no impact on ICh/ICl/PK constraints and
strictly increases the principal’s payoff given that W ′(U) > 1 − c/l when U < µ. Suppose
Ul = µ, pl < 1 and tl > 0. We can always replace pl, tl with pl+ε, tl−εl. This adjustment has
no impact on ICh/ICl/PK and (weakly) increases the principal’s payoff. If Ul = µ, pl = 1,
we know that the promised utility to the agent is at least µ. The optimal scheme is to
provide the unit forever. 
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Online appendix
“Dynamic Allocation without Money”
by Yingni Guo and Johannes Hörner
D Omitted Proofs
D.1 Complete Information
We review the solution under complete information by dropping (ICh) and (ICl).
If we ignore promises, the efficient policy is to supply the good if and only if the value is
h. The corresponding utility pair, denoted by (v∗h, v
∗
l ), satisfies




l } , v
∗








1− δ(1− ρh − ρl)
, v∗l =
δhρl
1− δ(1− ρh − ρl)
.
For a fixed U = (U(h), U(l)), the problems of delivering U(h) to a current high type and
U(l) to a current low type are uncoupled. If U(h) 6 v∗h, the good is supplied only when
the value is high. When U(h) > v∗h, the good is always supplied when the value is high,
and sometimes supplied when the value is low. We proceed analogously to deliver U(l). In






































































if U ∈ [v∗h, µl]× [v
∗
l , µl].
The derivative of W (differentiable except at U(h) = v∗h or U(l) = v
∗
l ) is in the interval
[1 − c/l, 1 − c/h], as expected. The latter corresponds to the most efficient allocation,
whereas the former corresponds to the most inefficient allocation.
1
E Continuous Time
We have opted for a discrete time framework because it embeds the case of independent
values – a natural starting point for which there is no counterpart in continuous time. Here,
we consider the continuous-time limit of the problem, by scaling the transition probabilities
according to the usual Poisson limit. Based on Lemmas 4 and 6 and Theorems 2 and 3, we
can extend the results in the discrete-time model to the continuous-time model. We start
with an overview of this model and the results, relegating some of the details and proofs to
section E.1.
The round length is ∆ > 0. The transition probabilities are set to ρh = λh∆ + o(∆),
ρl = λl∆ + o(∆). The agent’s utility from consuming the good is h∆ if his value is h
and l∆ if his value is l. The supply cost is c∆. We take ∆ to 0 and obtain the limiting
stochastic process of the agent’s value. Formally, this is a continuous-time Markov chain
(vt)t>0 (by definition, a right-continuous process) with state space {l, h}, transition matrix
((−λl, λl), (λh,−λh)), and initial probability q = λl/(λh+λl) of h. Let T0 = 0 and T1, T2, . . .
be the random times at which the value switches. We set T1 = 0 if the initial value is h such
that, by convention, vt = l on any interval [T2k, T2k+1) and vt = h on [T2k+1, T2k+2), for any
k ∈ N.
The incentive-compatible set V is characterized by the frontloading and backloading
policies. By taking the limit (as ∆ → 0) of the formulas for {fm, bm}m∈N, we obtain the
boundaries of V . In particular, the frontloading boundary is given in parametric form by34
f zh = E
[∫ z
0
e−rtvtdt | v0 = h
]
, f zl = E
[∫ z
0
e−rtvtdt | v0 = l
]
,
where z > 0 can be interpreted as the length of time that the agent is entitled to claim the
good with “no questions asked.”35
Similar to the discrete-time case, the principal might achieve the complete-information
payoff for some utility pairs on the frontloading boundary. Let U be the largest intersection
of the frontloading boundary {(f zh , f
z
l )}z>0 with the line U(l) =
λl
λl+r
U(h). It is immediately
34See appendix E.1 for the analytic expressions.
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Figure 7: Incentive-compatible set V for (λl, λh, r, l, h) = (1, 1, 1/4, 1, 5/2).







When the low type is too persistent, i.e., λl is too small, the complete-information payoff
cannot be achieved (except for 0, (µh, µl)). It can be achieved for some promised utility pairs
when the agent is sufficiently patient.
The optimal policy is given by a continuous-time process (zt)t>0, where zt is the promised
length of provision at time t. On any interval [T2k+1, T2k+2) over which h is continuously










E[e−rztvzt | v0 = l]
− 1.
This increment dzt is positive or negative depending upon whether zt maps onto a utility
vector above or below U . The interpretation is as in discrete time: whether the agent asks
for the unit or not, he must pay a fixed cost of 1 in terms of zt. However, conditional







W for p = 1
Figure 8: Value function and complete-information payoff as a function of z, for
(λl, λh, r, l, h, c) = (1/p, 1/p, 1/4, 1, 5/2, 2) and p = 1, 4.
substitution between the opportunity flow cost of giving up the current unit, l, and the
value of getting it at the future time zt. The agent is compensated at the end of the time zt,
because his expected value, conditional on being low today, increases in time. The interests
of the principal and the low type grow more congruent in time.
The optimal policy defines a tuple of continuous-time processes that follow deterministic
trajectories over any interval [Tk, Tk+1). First, the belief (φt)t>0 of the principal takes values
in the set {0, 1}. Namely, φt = 0 over any interval [T2k, T2k+1), and φt = 1 otherwise.
Second, the utilities of the agent (Ut(h), Ut(l))t>0 are functions of his type and the promise
zt. Finally, the expected payoff of the principal, (Wt)t>0, is computed according to his
belief φt and the promise to the agent. Continuous time allows to explicitly solve for the
principal’s value function, although the expression is quite complicated. Because her belief
is degenerate, except at the initial instant, we write Wh(z) (resp., Wl(z)) for the payoff when
(she assigns probability one to the event that) the agent’s value is currently high (resp. low).
See appendix E.1 for a derivation of the value function. Here, we will restrict ourselves with
illustrations.
Figure 8 illustrates the value function for two levels of persistence p = 1, 4 and compares
it to the complete-information payoff W evaluated along the frontloading boundary when
p = 1.36
What about the agent’s utility? Persistence plays an ambiguous role in determining the
agent’s utility: perfect persistence is his favorite outcome if µ > c, because always providing
the good is the principal’s best option. Conversely, perfect persistence is the agent’s worst
36The value function is concave on the agent’s promised utility pair but not on z.
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outcome if µ < c. Hence, persistence tends to improve the agent’s situation when µ > c.
However, this convergence is not necessarily monotone, which is easy to verify via examples.
As r → 0, the principal’s value converges to the complete-information payoff q(h − c).
We conclude with a rate of convergence which is higher than the convergence rate of quota
mechanisms as in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007).
Lemma 8. It holds that
|max
z
W (z)− q(h− c)| = O(r).
Lastly, we examine the impact of varying h or l on the value function W (z) numerically,
for any fixed λh, λl, r and c. Since q equals λl/(λh + λl), it is fixed as well. We make three
observations. First, we fix the expected value of the unit (i.e., µ = qh+(1− q)l) and vary h.
Simulations show that the value function W (z) increases pointwise in h. (See figure 9.) As
we increase the high type’s value h, the low type’s value l decreases. The agent’s preferences
become more congruent with the principal’s. Hence, for any promised length of provision z,







Figure 9: Value function for (λl, λh, r, c) =







Figure 10: Value function for (λl, λh, r, c) =
(1, 1, 1/2, 2) and l = 1.
Second, we fix l and vary h. The value function W (z) increases pointwise in h. This is
shown in figure 10. Increasing h while fixing l has two effects. First, a unit is on average
worth more to the agent, so the payoff to the principal from providing the unit also increases.
Second, the agent’s preferences become more aligned with the principal’s. Both effects
suggest that the principal’s value shall be higher. This is confirmed by the simulations.
Third, we fix h and vary l. The principal’s maximal payoff is not monotone in l. This








Figure 11: Value function for (λl, λh, r, c) = (1, 1, 1/2, 2) and h = 3.
one hand, a unit is on average worth more to the agent. On the other, the low type is more
tempted to claim the unit. The example shows that, among three low values, the principal’s
payoff is the highest when l = .2. It decreases as l increases to 1, and then increases as l
increases to 1.8.
E.1 Continuous Time: Details and Proofs
We first derive the formulas for the frontloading boundary by considering the Poisson limit.
Write ρh = λh∆, ρl = λl∆, δ = e
−r∆. We fix the total length of provision z and take ∆ to
zero. The frontloading boundary is smooth, and is given in parametric forms by
f zh = (1− e
−rz)µh + e
−rz(1− e−(λh+λl)z)(1− q)(µh − µl),
f zl = (1− e
−rz)µl − e
−rz(1− e−(λh+λl)z)q(µh − µl),
where q = λl/(λh + λl) is the invariant probability of h, and (µh, µl) is the agent’s utility
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Given the optimal policy, let dzl and dzh be the incremental change in zt when the agent’s
report is low and high, respectively. Define the function
g(z) := q(h− l)e−(λh+λl)z + lerz − µ,





where µ = qh+(1−q)l, as before. If V has a nonempty interior, we can identify the value of
z that is the intersection of the line U(l) = λl
λl+r
U(h) and the frontloading boundary {f z}z>0;
call this value z, which is simply the positive root (if any) of g. Otherwise, set z = 0. Also,
recall that dzh = −1.
We now motivate the derivation of the differential equations solved by Wh,Wl. Given
the optimal policy, the value functions solve the following paired system of equations:
Wh(z) = rdt(h− c) + λhdtWl(z) + (1− rdt− λhdt)Wh(z + dzh) +O(dt
2),
and
Wl(z) = λldtWh(z) + (1− rdt− λldt)Wl(z + dzl) +O(dt
2).
Assume for now (as will be verified) that the functions Wh,Wl are twice differentiable. We
then obtain the differential equations37








We directly work with the expected payoff W (z) = qWh(z)+(1−q)Wl(z). Using the system




−(λh+λl)zW ′(z) + µ(r(λh + λl)W (z) + λlW
′(z)− rλl(h− c)).
(27)
37To be clear, these are not HJB equations, as there is no need to verify the optimality of the policy that
is being followed. This fact has already been established. The functions must satisfy these simple recursive
equations.
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The value function W must satisfy the following boundary conditions. First, at z = z, the
value must coincide with the complete-information payoff W in that range. We let W 1 denote
the complete-information payoff for those z such that (f zh , f
z





f zh , f
z
l and simplifying, we obtain the formula for W 1(z):





+ (1− q)f zl
h− c
h
= (1− e−rz)(1− c/h)µ.
We must have W (z) = W (z) = W 1(z). Second, as z → ∞, it must hold that the payoff
µ− c is approached. Hence,
lim
z→∞
W (z) = µ− c.
Let ẑ denote the positive root of
χ(z) := µe−rz − (1− q)l.
As is easy to see, this root always exists and is strictly above z, with χ(z) > 0 iff z < ẑ.
Finally, let




It is then straightforward to verify (though not quite as easy to obtain) that:38































if z ∈ [z, ẑ),




























if z > ẑ,
where
W 1(z) := (1− e
−rz)(1− c/h)µ.
Proof of Lemma 8. The proof is divided into two steps. First we show that the difference
in payoffs between W (z) and the complete-information payoff computed at the same level
38As z → ẑ, the integrals entering in the definition of W diverge, although not W itself, given that
limz→ẑ χ(z) → 0. As a result, limz→ẑ W (z) is well-defined, and strictly below W 1(ẑ).
8
of utility f z converges to 0 at a rate linear in r, for all z. Second, we show that the
distance between the closest point on the graph of {f z}z>0 and the complete-information
payoff maximizing utility pair (which is v∗) converges to 0 at a rate linear in r. Given that
the complete-information payoff is piecewise affine in utilities, the result follows from the
triangle inequality.





, where W 1 is defined in Proposition 1 and W 2 is the complete-
information payoff for those z such that (f zh , f
z









and simplifying, we obtain the formula for W 2(z):






















= (1− e−rz)(1− c/l)µ+ q(h/l − 1)c.





because W 1(z),W 2(z) are two of the four affine maps whose lower envelope defines W .
(See section D.1.)
Fix y = rz (note that as r → 0, z → ∞, so that changing variables is necessary to
compare limiting values as r → 0), and fix y such that ley > µ (that is, such that














g(y/r) = ley − µ.






















converges to a well-defined limit. (Note that the value of ẑ is irrelevant to this quantity,
and we might as well use rẑ = ln(µ/((1− q)l)), a quantity independent of r.) Denote
9









it follows that W (y/r) = W 1(y/r) + O(r). On y > rẑ, it is immediate to check from
the formula of Proposition 1 that






















By definition of ẑ, χ(z) is now negative. By the same steps it follows that W (y/r) =
W 2(y/r) +O(r) on y > rẑ. Because W =W 1 for z < z, this concludes the first step.
2. For the second step, note that the utility pair maximizing complete-information payoff











































and so ‖f z
∗
− v∗‖ = O(r). It is also easily verified that this gives an upper bound on
the order of the distance between the polygonal chain and the point v∗. This concludes
the second step. 
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